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Abstract 
The South African government is confronted with hard choices on how to harness 
financial management reforms while reducing costs associated with financial 
misconduct. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the credibility of national 
government budgets. The objective of this study involved providing an analysis of the 
three budgetary outcomes: levels of fiscal discipline, strategic prioritisation, and 
operational efficiency. The study found that while the budget acts as a key policy 
statement of the government, public expenditure management (PEM) acts as an 
instrument of government policy. It is used by the South African government to collect 
taxes and fund its projects, and emphasises the efficient and effective use of 
resources. The study further suggests that there are three mutually exclusive, 
complementary and interdependent basic budget outcomes of public expenditure 
management, namely financial discipline, allocative efficiency, and operational 
efficiency. In addition to these budget outcomes, accountability and transparency are 
secondary outcomes that are critical for public expenditure management.  
The research further attempted to highlight that the South African government is 
borrowing money to pay for current spending, a practice the researcher deems an 
unsustainable spending regime. The rigorous planning process of the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) is meant to ensure that allocations are made to 
government’s priority areas such as education and health. Budget allocations are 
reflective of government’s strategic priorities and the current broad policy framework, 
known as the National Development Plan (NDP). The shifting of funds in-year, known 
as virements, is counterproductive in view of the fact that funds are shifted from priority 
areas. Excessive spending in March coupled with under-spending by national 
government departments signifies weak financial controls and bad spending practices. 
The study concluded that financial misconduct is rampant in government and the 
situation is exacerbated by the absence of consistent and appropriate sanctioning of 
officials. The study also concluded that there is a requirement for institutions similar to 
the National Treasury, institutions that will ensure fiscal sustainability and prudential 
fiscal management. 
Key words: 
Financial discipline, allocative efficiency, operational efficiency, accountability and 
transparency. 
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Opsomming 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse regering staar moeilike besluite in die gesig oor hoe om finansiële 
hervormings te implementeer en terselfdertyd koste wat gepaardgaan met finansiële 
wanbestuur te verminder. Die doel van hierdie mini-tesis is om die geloofwaardigheid 
van nasionale regeringsbegrotings te bepaal. Die studie het drie begrotingsuitkomste 
ondersoek: vlakke van fiskale dissipline, strategiese prioritisering, en produktiwiteits-
doeltreffendheid. Die studie het bevind dat hoewel die begroting dien as ‘n sleutel-
beleidsverklaring van die regering, openbare bestedingbestuur as die instrument van 
regeringsbeleid dien. Dit word deur die Suid-Afrikaanse regering gebruik om belasting 
in te vorder asook om projekte te finansier, en beklemtoon die doeltreffende en 
doelmatige gebruik van hulpbronne. Die studie dui verder op drie wedersyds 
eksklusiewe, komplementêre en interafhanklike basiese begrotingsuitkomste van 
openbare finansiële bestedingsbestuur, naamlik finansiële dissipline, toewysing-
doeltreffendheid en operasionele doeltreffendheid. Benewens hierdie 
begrotingsuitkomste is die volgende sekondêre uitkomste onontbeerlik vir openbare 
finansiële bestedingsbestuur: aanspreeklikheid en deursigtigheid. 
Die navorsing het voorts gepoog om aan te toon dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regering tans 
geld leen om vir lopende uitgawes te betaal, ‘n praktyk wat volgens die navorser ‘n 
onvolhoubare bestedingspraktyk is. Die streng beplanningsproses van die 
mediumtermyn bestedingsraamwerk – of Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) – is daarop gemik om te verseker dat toekennings aan die regering se 
prioriteitsgebiede soos opvoeding en gesondheid gemaak word. Begrotingstoekennings 
weerspieël die regering se strategiese prioriteite asook die huidige oorkoepelende 
beleidsraamwerk, wat bekendstaan as die Nasionale Ontwikkelingsprogram – of 
National Development Plan (NDP). Die oordrag van fondse in-jaar, bekend as viremente, 
is teenproduktief, omdat fondse vanuit prioriteitsareas oorgedra word. Oormatige 
besteding in Maart, tesame met onderbesteding deur regeringsdepartemente, dui op 
swak finansiële beheer en swak bestedingspraktyke. Die gevolgtrekking van die studie 
is dat finansiële wanpraktyk hoogty vier in die regering en dat die situasie vererger word 
deur die afwesigheid van konsekwente en toepaslike strafmaatreëls vir amptenare. ‘n 
Verdere slotsom van die studie is dat daar ‘n vereiste bestaan vir instellings soortgelyk 
aan die Nasionale Tesourie wat fiskale volhoubaarheid en omsigtige fiskale bestuur sal 
verseker. 
Sleutelwoorde: 
Finansiële dissipline, toewysing-doeltreffendheid, operasionele doeltreffendheid, 
aanspreeklikheid en deursigtigheid. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE 
STUDY 
1.1. Introduction 
Each February, the Minister of Finance tables an annual budget to fund government 
operations for the upcoming financial year. The legislature also adopts a three-year 
spending framework that allows for improved alignment of policy and implementation 
over this period and provides a credible anchor for expectations about the medium-
term path of fiscal policy. However, annual budget decisions have consequences for 
the current budget year and beyond the subsequent three years. The provision of new 
social services creates an implicit obligation to offer these services well into the future. 
A budget is, therefore, a process through which choices have to be made about 
competing government priorities.  
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the extent to which the South African national 
government achieves the budgetary outcomes of fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency, 
and operational efficiency through its budget. Public expenditure management (PEM) 
is an instrument through which the government collects taxes and funds its projects 
and was introduced by the World Bank (WB) in early 1998 (Rajaram & Mallika, 2001).  
This chapter provides an overview and rationale of the study whilst also outlining its 
research question and objectives. In addition, the research design and methodology 
used in gathering data are discussed. The chapter concludes by giving a synopsis of 
the other chapters of this thesis.  
1.2. Overview and rationale of the study 
Governments are under pressure to provide public goods and services and a majority 
of these are funded by public funds, while there is also an increasing demand for 
accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness by the public. This mounting 
pressure has resulted in governments around the world being required to justify their 
expenditures. In response to these setbacks, the WB and its affiliated institutions, the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) multi-agency partnership 
programme, have introduced a number of initiatives, including a set of guidelines for 
improving budgetary and financial management in the public sector, namely the Public 
Expenditure Management Reform and the Performance Measurements Framework 
(PMF) performance rating system (World Bank, 1998). The PMF performance rating 
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system is intended to provide an objective and internationally comparable framework 
for assessing the performance of a country’s public finances (Quist & Dendura, 2008). 
Both the PMF and the public expenditure and financial accountability programme are 
based on the government having a decisive influence on budgetary outcomes at three 
levels: at an aggregate fiscal discipline level, where the total amount of money a 
government spends should be closely aligned with what is affordable; at the 
intermediate level (allocative efficiency), where spending should be aligned with 
government’s priorities; and at a service delivery level (operational efficiency), where 
the spending should produce intended results without incurring a waste. These levels 
of budgetary outcomes are discussed in detail below.  
1.2.1. Aggregate fiscal discipline  
Aggregate fiscal discipline refers to prudent and transparent fiscal management based 
on realistic revenue expenditure estimates, and the technical capacity to set up fiscal 
targets and enforce them. The fiscal stance of South Africa has been to maintain an 
expenditure ceiling, supported by policies aimed at improving spending efficiency 
(National Treasury, 2014). An expenditure ceiling is the maximum level of expenditure 
permitted at an aggregate level. Since the 2008 recession, the South African 
government has used the fiscal space (budget surpluses) accumulated during the 
2000s to support the economy, balance the needs of growth and stabilise its debt 
(National Treasury, 2014). As debt stabilised, the government committed to rebuilding 
fiscal space by reducing the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product 
(National Treasury, 2014). As a result of questions about the aggregate fiscal discipline 
of South Africa’s budgets, five performance indicators (PI) were used by the researcher 
to measure the aggregate fiscal discipline of South Africa’s budgets, and they are: 
aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget, composition of 
expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget, aggregate revenue out-
turn compared to original approved budget, the March spike, and the in-year shifting 
of funds. The first three indicators are derived from public expenditure and financial 
accountability, while the last two are based on South Africa’s practices.  
1.2.2. Allocative efficiency 
Allocative efficiency refers to the allocation of scarce resources to the most cost-
effective programmes, projects and activities in strategic areas (Allen & Tommasi, 
2001). The objective of allocative efficiency is to ensure that resources managed by 
the government are spent sensibly. Efficiency in allocation is the skill of distributing 
sources equitably in budget priorities (National Treasury, 2015a). In this instance, 
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allocative efficiency is aimed at replacing inefficient activities with more cost-effective 
activities, which are in line with state goals that are of great significance (Allen & 
Tommasi, 2001). Expenditures must be based on the government's priorities and the 
efficiency of public programmes. To measure allocative efficiency, the following five 
performance indicators (PI) are used:  
 the Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF);  
 the composition of government expenditure;  
 debts-service cost as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP); and  
 income and expenditure.  
1.2.3. Operational efficiency  
Operational efficiency mainly concerns the service delivery level and is dependent on 
arrangements to implement programmes within government departments on the basis 
of efficient and effective management systems. The effective utilisation of budget 
sources technically and functionally is dependent on the capacity of designed 
programmes and the provision of services with lower cost or minimising the per capita 
income (Allen & Tommasi, 2001). To measure operational efficiency, value for money 
and controls in procurement were used.  
All three budgetary outcomes are strongly correlated, both theoretically and practically 
(World Bank, 1998). Correlation in statistical terms implies that the occurrence of one 
variable coincides with the occurrence of another. Fiscal discipline as a budgetary 
outcome improves as the government is able to spend its resources on priority areas, 
with departments spending funds wisely. These three budgetary outcomes are 
complementary and interdependent. Public expenditure management emphasises 
performance, assessed in relation to the goals of fiscal sustainability, economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds (Premchand, 1993). It is 
important to pay attention to the interaction between these three budgetary outcomes 
and the institutional arrangements within which they are embedded.  
The nexus of all these budgetary outcomes is fiscal discipline; without them, it would 
be impossible to achieve effective prioritisation and implementation of policy priorities 
and programmes. However, Djurović-Todorović and Djordjević (2009) propose that 
mere fiscal discipline in the presence of arbitrary resource allocation and inefficient 
operations is inherently unsustainable. It is thus important that all the budgetary 
outcomes be considered by the government in order to ensure not only effective 
prioritisation and implementation of policy but also the appropriate allocation of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
resources. The WB proposes two additional central pillars of sound public financial 
management to complement the three basic budgetary outcomes of public expenditure 
management, and they are transparency and accountability. These pillars are critical 
in exposing inherent costs and, when required, in effecting explicit sanctions on 
politicians and bureaucrats for violating budgetary rules. In this context, accountability 
means that politicians and public officials have to respond periodically to questions 
concerning their activities and must be held responsible for the exercise of the authority 
provided to them (Djurović-Todorović & Djordjević, 2009). Due to the accountability 
bestowed upon politicians and public officials, evidence of misuse of public funds 
should lead to consequences and wrongdoers must be held accountable. Corruption, 
which is the misuse of public or private office for direct or indirect personal gain, poses 
moral and legal problems such as fraud and wasteful expenditure and is a major source 
of inefficiency in public expenditure management (Djurović-Todorović & Djordjević, 
2009).  
1.3. Research question 
The main question that this study addressed is: To what extent do South African 
national government departments comply with the principles of public expenditure 
management? In order to answer this question, the study asked the following 
supplementary questions:  
 is there control of aggregate expenditure to ensure affordability and sustainability 
that is consistent with the macroeconomic constraints?  
 are there effective means for achieving resource allocation that reflects 
expenditure policy priorities?  
 is there minimisation of the financial costs of budgetary management (allocative 
efficiency)?  
 are there controls and measures to deal with inefficient expenditure (technical 
inefficiency)?  
 what are the consequences of non-compliance with the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) and expected norms and standards as prescribed?  
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1.4. Research objectives 
The main research objective of this study was to assess whether national government 
departments comply with the principles of public expenditure management. Attaining 
this primary objective entailed:  
 Describing public expenditure and related constraints 
 describing whether the public expenditure is consistent with the macroeconomic 
constraints;  
 determining whether budget allocations are reflective of the level of performance 
of programmes;  
 assessing whether government expenditure is characterised by efficiencies in 
spending;  
 examining the effectiveness of the application of expenditure management 
controls; and  
 evaluating the consequences of non-compliance to public expenditure 
management.  
1.5. Research design 
The study adopted a ‘case-study’ research approach as a means of achieving the 
objectives set out in the previous section. The selection of the case study approach 
was informed by the nature of the research problem investigated in this study. The 
case studies were carefully selected due to ease of access to information. Using 
existing sources of data, the study adopted a content analysis approach in the analysis 
of the cases under investigation. In his text, Thomas (2006) defines the inductive 
approach as a systematic procedure for analysing qualitative data in which the analysis 
is likely to be guided by specific evaluation objectives. He further states that the primary 
purpose of the inductive approach is to allow research findings to emerge from the 
frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints 
imposed by structured methodologies (Thomas, 2006).  
The research was based on a non-empirical design with a focus on secondary data 
analyses of the budgetary outcomes. Information on these budgetary outcomes was 
gathered from published South African government documents. The documents 
analysed included but were not limited to documents published by the National 
Treasury; the Reserve Bank of South Africa; Statistics South Africa; the Auditor-
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General South Africa; and the departmental annual reports, strategic plans and annual 
performance plans.  
1.6. Research methodology 
The study adopted a qualitative research method in pursuit of its research objectives. 
Qualitative research comprises interviews, questionnaires, case studies and analysis 
of the data gathered from literature (Burger, 2014). According to Myers, qualitative 
research is designed to help researchers understand people and the social and cultural 
contexts within which they exist (Myers, 2009). Such studies allow the complexities 
and differences of the phenomenon under study to be explored and represented 
(Philip, 1998). In this study, qualitative research involved the analysis of secondary 
sources of data collected from various sources including memos, notes, annual 
reports, budget documents, strategic plans and annual performance plans. This 
research technique is referred to as ‘document analysis’, in which the data collected 
from various secondary sources of information relevant to the study are analysed to 
achieve the objectives of the study (Silverman, 2001). Stebbins cautions against the 
risk of unreliability and illegitimacy of data collected from secondary sources; more so 
when collected from non-academic or non-official documents such as newspaper 
articles and magazines (Stebbins, 2001). This study depended primarily on official 
reports from various case studies. This includes documents from the National 
Treasury; the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA); Statistics South Africa (Stats 
SA); the South African Reserve Bank (SARB); the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
1.7. Data analysis method 
Inductive data analysis was applied, using the content of the sources of data consulted. 
According to Neuman, content analysis is a technique for examining information 
content in written material (Neuman, 2003). In other words, content analysis is 
collecting and organising information systematically in a standard format that allows a 
researcher to draw conclusions about the characteristics and meaning of recorded 
material. Furthermore, Babbie and Mouton (2004) state that the content analysis 
method can be applied to any form of communication (Babbie & Mouton, 2004). 
Therefore, the data was analysed using content analysis around themes and concepts 
on policy implementation.  
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1.8. Outline of the chapters 
Chapter 1 – introduces and sets out the context of the study. This chapter unpacks 
the problem statement and motivation for the study. It identifies the research problem, 
provides the research question, indicates the research design and methodology, and 
provides an outline for the remainder of the study.  
Chapter 2 – encompasses the literature review. This chapter summarises the existing 
literature around the subject of public expenditure management as well as governance 
and budgeting issues concerned. It also includes the legislative, theoretical, and 
conceptual frameworks that underpin key variables discussed.  
Chapter 3 – discusses aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved 
budget, aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget, and the 
composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget. The 
chapter further discusses elements such as virements and fiscal dumping. Lastly, the 
chapter explores other budgetary elements such as the credibility of government’s 
estimates for both revenue and expenditure.  
Chapter 4 – discusses value-for-money principles, aggregate fiscal discipline, and 
allocative and operational efficiencies.  
Chapter 5 – discusses accountability and transparency, additional budgetary 
outcomes of the public expenditure management. This chapter also answers questions 
about the consequences of lack of adherence to procurement controls and laws.  
Chapter 6 – concludes and makes recommendations based on the study. The chapter 
summarises and discusses salient points, interprets results in terms of the literature or 
theory, discusses gaps, anomalies and or deviations in the data, makes the 
significance of the results explicit, and makes policy recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2 : LITERATURE REVIEW ON EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT 
2.1. Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapter, public expenditure management reforms seek 
to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure by linking resource 
allocation to outputs through making systematic use of performance information. 
These reforms were introduced after various countries started implementing 
management concepts from the private sector into their administrations (Aucoin, 1990; 
Behn, 1995). These ideas were founded in the new public management (NPM) 
paradigm and attempt to generate value for money by improving the ‘three Es' 
(efficiency, effectiveness and economy) of public services (Starks, 1991). Proponents 
of NPM associate the implementation of these concepts with higher public sector 
performance (Hood, 1995; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Paterson, 1988). They argue 
that the public sector would benefit more from the experiences of the private sector. In 
addition, NPM is thought to bring the efficiency and effectiveness of the private sector 
to the public sector while ensuring sustainable gains by producing assets and services 
at the lowest cost (Schick, 1999). However, NPM critics such as Dunleavy, Margetts, 
Bastow and Tinkler (2006) posit that NPM brought problems of inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in the public sector due to the increased number of government 
administrative units and complex and disintegrated working relations among 
government units (Dunleavy et al., 2006). Conditions such as improving institutional 
arrangements and management practices are present in order to create incentives for 
better resource allocation, resource use and financial management.  
The following section looks at the existing literature on public expenditure management 
outcomes. In addition, the section unpacks public expenditure controls and budgetary 
outcomes. The chapter continues by discussing the literature on other budget-related 
outcomes such as value for money, accountability and transparency. The chapter 
concludes by providing theoretical and legislative frameworks of budgeting and 
expenditure control in South Africa.  
2.2. Public expenditure control 
Under public expenditure management, financial resources are managed alongside 
other key resources, such as personnel and performance information; plans and 
decisions are resource constrained rather than needs based; and performance 
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assessment contributes to planning and decision-making (Fozzard & Foster, 2001). 
This shift in thinking has challenged the traditional administrative approaches that have 
emphasised expenditure control assessed in terms of compliance with procedures and 
legislation. Such expenditure controls are expressed in the annual budget to a revised 
approach that focuses on performance, assessed in relation to the goals of 
macroeconomic stabilisation, economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of 
public funds (Premchand, 1993). These goals have subsequently been revised in 
public expenditure management reforms to three outcomes: aggregate fiscal 
discipline, allocative efficiency and operational efficiency. These factors form the 
foundation of public expenditure management reforms; accordingly, they have been 
seen as the ultimate outcome of the public expenditure management and are seen as 
complementary and interdependent. This is to say that aggregate fiscal control is only 
important if the government is allocating money on key priorities (allocative efficiency) 
and spending it prudently (operational efficiency).  
It is against this backdrop that public expenditure management emphasises value for 
money through sound financial and management controls. Pauw, Woods, Van der 
Linde, Fourie and Visser (2002) highlight that the goal of financial management in 
government is to ensure that resources provided by the public are spent sensibly for 
the public (Pauw et al., 2002). In addition, Schacter believes that to be able to portray 
the value added to a society through a policy intervention, public expenditure 
management will be sufficient in maintaining the support of relevant stakeholders 
(Schacter, 2006). Therefore, tracking costs against deliverables helps one to 
understand the value for money in government programmes.  
2.3. Public expenditure management and aggregate fiscal control 
Aggregate fiscal control entails the fully credible revenue and aggregate expenditure 
outcomes forecasting that matches the budget estimates very closely and ultimately 
results in successful debt management strategies. Fiscal prudence is premised on 
negative connotations linked with debt, bearing in mind that public debt and economic 
growth tend to point to a negative relationship. Tanzi (2006) suggests that public debt 
has an adverse effect on the growth of the economy and this is particularly evident in 
a free market environment. This negative impact of public debt on economic growth, 
in relation to the policy perspective, strengthens the arguments for ambitious debt 
reduction through fiscal consolidation. This is to say that the total amount of money a 
government spends should be closely aligned with what is affordable over the medium 
term and, in turn, with the annual budget. Spending should be appropriately allocated 
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to match policy priorities, and the spending should produce intended results at the least 
cost. This, therefore, means that the credibility of forward estimates of budget ceilings 
need to be forecasted with more accuracy. The public expenditure management 
handbook, however, notes that there is a tendency to overestimate revenue in many 
countries. This cannot be attributed to technical shortcomings of the revenue 
forecasting models but suggests that politics lies at the heart of overestimating revenue 
(World Bank, 1998). The success of public expenditure management reform cannot be 
dissociated from more fundamental institutional reforms within the government. This 
requires a high-level commitment to the reform process in order to push through 
reforms against the opposition of vested interests, both within and outside of the 
government. It also requires some measure of policy stability, given that the 
institutional reforms will take years to implement (Fozzard & Foster, 2001). Scott 
highlights that owing to public expenditure management, the flexibility and efficiency 
of financial administration should increase (Scott, 2001) in view of the fact that 
managers are able to allocate resources corresponding to current needs rather than 
historical expectations that are represented in the estimates (Boyle, 1991).  
Within public expenditure management, the literature on budgeting systems focuses 
on the financial, technical and institutional aspects (Grizzle & Pettijohn, 2002; Melkers 
& Willoughby, 2005; Van der Hoek, 2005). In 1996, South Africa introduced major 
financial management and budget reforms with the aim to improve fiscal sustainability, 
align spending with the national priorities and maximise existing resources towards 
these priorities (Quist, Certan & Dendura, 2008). Public expenditure management has 
produced many improvements, including value for money within a paradigm that 
emphasises quality and sustainability of government services. However, a number of 
areas including financial misconduct still require attention (Baboojee, 2011).  
Debt ratio and debt financing are more than financial issues; they are a policy 
imperative that addresses the shortcomings of financial management controls. Despite 
the fact that the economic growth rate is likely to have a linear negative impact on the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio (a decline in the economic growth rate as everything else 
remains the same and associated with an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio), 
high levels of public debt are likely to be deleterious for growth (Checherita & Rother, 
2010). Zagler and Dürnecker state that fiscal policies need to remain sustainable. They 
reason that if the fiscal policies are not sustainable, this will become a source of 
macroeconomic instability (Zagler & Dürnecker, 2003). The government must, 
therefore, remain solvent (able to pay off its debts at some future time), liquid (able to 
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meet its current obligations), and credible (retaining the confidence of investors in its 
solvency and liquidity status). As such, the role public expenditure management plays 
in South Africa is to counteract variations in the business cycle and build fiscal space 
during good times to enable response to shocks and recession. This keeps debt and 
interest payment levels low while ensuring that the future generation is as well off as 
the current generation. The South African government proposed to do this through 
stabilising public debt as a share of GDP through achieving a balance between 
revenue growth, borrowing and growth in spending; hence, aligning the budget to the 
priorities of government (RSA, 2012). If the government can achieve this, it would be 
able to create fiscal space for tough times like the recession. Heller defines fiscal space 
as the government’s budget that allows it to provide the resources for the desired 
purpose without jeopardising the sustainability of its financial position or the stability of 
the economy (Heller, 2005).  
The effectiveness of government programmes, for example the efficiency with which 
revenues are raised, the cost-effectiveness of public service delivery, or how well 
public resources are protected from corruption and waste, all depend crucially on the 
quality of public financial management institutions in a country. In the 2011/12 financial 
year, the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act of 2009 was 
passed by the Parliament of South Africa. The Act effectively gave Parliament and its 
structures influence on the budget. This means that the Parliament can preside over 
how much is needed, how it can be made available and how much is allocated to each 
sphere of government. The Act has brought in checks and balances in the system as 
clear principles for fiscal policy will strengthen parliamentary oversight of the budget 
processes, encourage greater transparency, and enhance public accountability. 
Furthermore, institutions such as the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), the 
Auditor-General and the Public Protector provide an impartial assessment of whether 
the South African government is meeting its objectives despite the fact that the three 
outcomes cannot be overlooked.  
2.4. Public expenditure management and allocative efficiencies 
Public expenditure management is a scientific approach, a paradigm shift from a 
traditional non-scientific and ill-informed approach of budget incrementalism. Budget 
incrementalism refers to a process when departments increase their budgets by 
inflation or some other equivalent without taking into account programme performance 
(Robinson, 2013). Budget incrementalism is generally viewed as the least effective 
way of allocating resources. Berry (1990) suggests that budgetary decision-makers 
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can move away from budget incrementalism by bringing elements of evidence into the 
budget process and interrogating the baselines of institutions or programme 
budgets. The Department of National Treasury has realised that the economic 
recovery from the 2008 recession has been slow. It is further reported that it will 
presumably take another decade or two for South Africa to return to its budget 
surpluses and good credit ratings (National Treasury, 2010). This has led to reforms 
to integrate greater control over the limited programmes that can be implemented. 
These reforms have called for PI to be an integral part of budget allocations, as 
opposed to merely increasing the budgets. Through these reforms, resource allocation 
decisions are made with constant reference to PI and whether targets are being met 
(Scheps, 2000). Therefore, rationalising budgeting entails efforts to improve decision-
making by moving the focus away from budget incrementalism towards results-based 
resource allocations. Allocative efficiency also speaks to the composition of 
government expenditure. For this reason, there is a need to interrogate the 
composition of government expenditure and to strike an appropriate balance between 
capital and current spending. This balance is often referred to as allocative efficiency.  
The composition of government expenditure is skewed towards compensation of 
employees, with 33 percent of government expenditure spent on this item (National 
Treasury, 2012). Moreno-Dodson (2013) suggests that certain categories of public 
expenditure, such as investment in capital assets, can be referred to as operational 
and they are projected to be more growth-enhancing than others (Moreno-Dodson, 
2013). This also supports the trajectory echoed in the Musgrave framework, which 
stipulates that the allocation of funds to capital assets is conducive for growth because 
of the impact it has on the positive economic outlook through increased productivity 
and work opportunities. Ngandu, Garcia and Arndt (2010) conducted a study analysing 
the economic impact of the planned infrastructural investment programme on the 
South African economy (Ngandu et al., 2010). Their results drew attention to the fact 
that the planned infrastructure programme has the potential to significantly offset the 
contraction effects of the global downturn. Fedderke and Garlick (2008) also 
investigated the relationship between infrastructure and economic growth. Their results 
found that the theoretical and empirical evidence supports the existence of a robust 
positive relationship between infrastructure and economic growth. Context-based 
literature therefore suggests a need to spend on infrastructure. Government spending 
should be channelled towards capital assets and infrastructure as means of ensuring 
that there is at least a level of balance between the consumption and investment 
expenditures. This view is further echoed by Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), who 
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through their work distinguished between “capital” and “current” government spending 
(Ghosh & Gregoriou, 2008). Their empirical tests demonstrate that capital spending 
results in the accumulation of the public capital stock, whereas current public spending 
flows finance public services.  
2.5. Public expenditure management and operational efficiency 
The public expenditure management handbook recognises technical efficiency as the 
third outcome of public expenditure management and describes it as efficiency and 
productivity. These terms describe ratios of inputs to outputs or to outcomes. Efficiency 
and productivity are essentially equivalent, differing only in the way in which the ratio 
is expressed. Efficiency is defined as the ratio of inputs to outputs (or outcomes) and 
is usually expressed as the number of employees or amount of employees’ time per 
unit of output (or outcome). It is sometimes referred to as unit cost. Productivity is the 
ratio of the amount of output or outcome to inputs, traditionally expressed as the 
amount of output (or outcome) per unit of input. Operational efficiency entails focusing 
on improvement. This improvement is aimed at utilising the resources better, faster 
and in the most economical way. 
The Finnish Ministry of Finance brings the human resources component into the public 
expenditure management trajectory. The Ministry of Finance argues that results must 
be achieved by continuously improving operational processes and improving the skills 
of the workforce (Ministry of Finance, 2006). This analysis ties in with Robinson and 
Brumby’s productivity dividend theory, which argues that, keeping everything else 
constant, the more productive workforce will achieve efficiency gains (Robinson & 
Brumby, 2005). Therefore, while public expenditure management ensures that there 
are sound financial controls in place and that performance information is part of the 
budget and resource allocation debate and helps the government deliver services in 
an economical, productive and efficient way, the cost effectiveness of programmes 
ensures that government spends effectively. Turcotte conducted a study that 
emphasises that the basis for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of 
government programmes cannot solely be based on costs; it can also be based on 
performance measures (Turcotte, 1999). His study illustrates that it is crucial to 
understand all the inputs, activities and processes that lead to outputs in government 
programmes. This view is further articulated by Castro, who states that programme 
costing entails linking funding to results by using performance indicators and taking 
into account external factors that may affect implementation (Castro, 2011). A study 
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by Brumby et al. (cited in Athukorala & Reid, 2003) provided evidence of efficiency 
gains, measured in terms of unit costs of output.  
There is a growing consciousness that measures of institutional performance are 
essential if the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending is to be improved 
(Mackay, 2007). This can be done by instituting a procurement system that supports 
efficiency and effectiveness in the expenditure of public funds through clear and 
enforceable rules that promote competition, transparency and value for money 
(Andrade, Cavalcanti, Boakye, Van der Linde, Mbungu et al., 2004). Operational 
efficiency is what the Auditor-General audits. The Auditor-General compiles findings 
on issues around supply-chain management and budgeting that may lead to a 
disclaimer of annual financial statements (AFS); unauthorised, irregular and fruitless, 
and wasteful expenditures. In this regard, the public expenditure management 
handbook states that:  
The focus of auditing is to determine whether public funds have been spent for the 
purposes for which they were designated. The scope of auditing should be 
sufficiently broad. The objectives of an audit should include: (a) compliance with 
budget appropriations; and (b) whether public funds purchased value for money 
(World Bank, 1998). 
To address the issue of inefficiencies in budgets, South Africa, like other countries, has 
adopted an efficiency dividend approach. This approach refers to imposed across-the-
board marginal cuts in operational spending that augment the pressure across the 
public sector to increase efficiency while generating fiscal savings. Some sectors may 
be spared on the grounds of necessity, priority or dependency on manpower (Marcel, 
2013). As per the National Treasury, from this approach the government realised 
savings from national departments amounting to R35.2 billion over the 2015 Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework (R10 billion in 2015/16, R15.1 billion in 2016/17 and 
R10.1 billion in 2017/18) (National Treasury, 2015a).  
Robinson (2013) states that there are two types of savings measures that spending 
review may be tasked to identify, efficiency savings and strategic savings. Spending 
review refers to an in-depth analysis of a programme with the view to finding the actual 
costs of delivering that programme. Efficiency savings (also referred to as “operational” 
savings) are expenditure reductions that are achieved by changing the way in which 
services are produced so as to deliver the same quantity and quality of services (i.e. 
outputs) at a lower cost (Robinson, 2013). Strategic savings (referred to as “output” 
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savings), by contrast, are expenditure reductions achieved by cutting back services 
(outputs) or transferring payment delivered to the community (Robinson, 2013). In the 
2015 budget, the South African national government implemented both types of 
savings measures; however, with strategic savings, where possible, the idea was to 
reschedule projects to later financial years.  
Aligned with the strategy to improve technical efficiency, governments have introduced 
expenditure reviews to help determine the true cost of government services (National 
Treasury, 2013). This is done as a result of government programmes having no pricing 
signal. In light of this, expenditure reviews are a strategic process of trying to root out 
inefficiencies in the system. The expenditure reviews are evaluations that focus largely 
on the financial issues (National Treasury, 2013). Like other evaluations, they are a 
systematic assessment of the operation of a programme compared to a set of explicit 
or implicit standards, as a means of contributing to the improvement of the programme 
(Weiss, 1998). These reviews are broadly in line with the public expenditure 
management trajectory of promoting allocative and operational efficiency through 
ensuring that budget allocation decisions are continuously reviewed to confirm their 
relevance and need to respond to social needs (Robinson & Brumby, 2005).  
2.6. Value for money 
“Value-for-money” principles propose that public expenditure management can be a 
driving force for operational and allocative efficiencies and resource effectiveness in 
government programmes. This is because it leads to greater emphasis on PI, including 
the establishment of the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) 
in 2009, to instigate the culture of performance in government institutions. Robinson 
and Brumby (2005) make an appealing analogy about the operational and allocative 
efficiency attained through public expenditure management when they link public 
expenditure management to macro-level goals of government (Robinson & Brumby, 
2005). They further suggest that by boosting operational and allocative efficiencies, all 
things being equal, government should realise some savings and if the idea is not to 
accumulate surpluses, then the tax burden on taxpayers can be reduced. While that is 
true, one of the key ideas of public expenditure management is its customer 
orientation, putting users at the heart of services. This way of thinking about service 
delivery is introduced in the paradigm and promotes the ideals of value for the money 
spent. However, public expenditure management needs to be embedded in an 
organisational culture. It cannot promote allocative and operational efficiency without 
an organisational culture with a management team that is supportive of this reform and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
has internalised it as a management function through managing for results techniques 
(Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2007). This is all the 
more so as citizens are putting governments under increasing pressure to show that 
they are providing value for money.  
2.7. Transparency 
Providing information about public sector performance can satisfy the public's right to 
know, and can act as a useful tool for the government to evaluate its performance. The 
information about allocative efficiency and value for money needs to be disseminated 
to the relevant stakeholders, including the end users, the public, and legislature and 
politicians in a manner that is acceptable and understandable. For instance, if the 
budget is on a cash basis, that is going to be the dominant basis on which politicians 
and the administration function. Financial reporting on different bases risks becoming 
a purely technical accounting exercise which provides information that might not be 
useful to the relevant stakeholders (Athukorala & Reid, 2003). This is not always 
simple, given that the government often provides services where there is no market or 
price signal. For this reason, the use of performance measures to narrate the story 
becomes ever more important to communicate the successes and failures of 
government intervention (Yaisawarng & Puthucheary, 1997). This position is echoed 
by Appiah-Adu & Satyendra (1998), who emphasise the need for strategies that are 
responsive to customer needs.  
While it might be a challenge to account to the public by portraying returns on 
investment in the absence of price signals on public goods, effective execution of 
strong developmental programmes will enhance financial controls by creating a healthy 
environment for a more customer-focused approach (Niven, 2003). It is widely held 
that the aim of government accounting and financial reporting is to protect and manage 
public money. Granof believes that public sector financial reporting should provide 
information in assisting users to assess what government has achieved, at what cost, 
and whether government has attained value for money spent, essentially the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of service costs (Granof, 1998).   
2.8. Legislative framework 
There are various laws regulating budgets of national, provincial and local 
governments, which are guided by the following:  
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996);  
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 The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 1997 (Act 97 of 1997);  
 The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 29 of 1999);  
 Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (Act 56 of 2003);  
 Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 2009 (Act 9 of 
2009);  
 Annual Division of Revenue Act and Appropriation Act;  
 Annual Division of Revenue Amendment Act and Adjustments Appropriation Act; 
and  
 Taxation laws and annual amendments.  
2.8.1. Constitution 
The Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (as amended) (RSA, 1996), provides 
the basis for public financial management. It assigns clear roles and responsibilities to 
the different spheres of government (national, provincial and local) that are supported 
by the provisions of the PFMA and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). It 
provides performance assurance through Sections 100 and 216, allowing for the 
intervention by the national government when an entity of government fails to perform 
an executive function related to financial management, and prescribes circumstances 
under which the National Treasury may withhold funds to other organs of state. The 
Constitution requires all money received by the national government to be paid into the 
National Revenue Fund.  
One of the important pieces of legislation is the Division of Revenue Act (DORA), an 
Act of Parliament which is voted annually to determine the vertical and horizontal 
allocation of resources. DORA establishes the annual transfers to provinces and 
municipalities, including the equitable share and the conditional grant share. Both are 
determined by a well-defined formula. In essence, this Act provides for:  
 equitable division of revenue raised nationally among national, provincial and 
local governments;  
 determination of each province’s equitable share; and  
 other allocations/grants to provinces and local government from the national 
government’s share (Section 214(1)).  
Before the adoption of DORA, Parliament must consult provincial governments and 
organised local government, and consider recommendations of the FFC (section 
214(2)). The FFC, a constitutional body, makes recommendations and advises organs 
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of state on financial as well as fiscal matters. The Constitution sets out principles to 
take into account in terms of the DORA. These include, but are not limited to, the 
national interest, need to ensure that provincial and local governments are able to 
deliver basic services, economic disparities within and among provinces, and 
desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue shares (section 214(2)). 
The Constitution states that:  
 National, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary processes must 
promote transparency, accountability and effective financial management of 
economy, debt and public sector (section 215(1)).  
 National legislation must determine the form of national, provincial and municipal 
budgets, when national and provincial budgets must be tabled and that budgets 
must show sources of revenue (section 215(2)).  
 Budgets must contain  
o estimates of revenue and expenditure, differentiating between capital and 
current expenditure;  
o proposals for financing anticipated deficit for affected period; intended 
borrowing that will increase public debt in next year (section 215(3)).  
2.8.2. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (IFRA) (1997) aims to promote co-
operation between national, provincial and local spheres on fiscal, budgetary and 
financial matters. It establishes the process of intergovernmental consultation in 
enacting the Division of Revenue Bill. This piece of legislation provides for:  
 A Budget Council: Minister of Finance and provincial MECs (Members of 
Provincial Executive Council) for finance;  
 A Local Government Budget Forum that should comprise of the following:  
o Minister of Finance;  
o provincial MECs for finance;  
o Five representatives of national organisations representing local 
government;  
o one representative of each provincial organisation representing the local 
government in the province.  
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Regarding the Division of Revenue Bill, the IFRA provides for the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission’s role, time frames for submission of the Commission’s recommendations 
to Parliament and the Minister of Finance, consultation with the Commission before 
the tabling of the Division of Revenue Bill, the content of the memorandum 
accompanying the Bill, namely how constitutional criteria and the Commission’s 
recommendations were taken into account in the Bill and the process for determination 
of an equitable share raised nationally.  
2.8.3. Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 2009 
The South African Constitution sets out different procedures to be followed in 
Parliament for different kinds of Bills (e.g. constitutional amendment Bills, money Bills, 
Bills regarding concurrent national and provincial functions and exclusive provincial 
functions). As such, a money Bill is a Bill that:  
 appropriates money;  
 imposes national taxes, levies, duties or surcharges;  
 abolishes/reduces, or grants exemptions from, any national taxes, levies, duties 
or surcharges;  
 authorises direct charges against the National Revenue Fund (except the 
Division of Revenue Bill).  
The Money Bills Amendment Act, a law required by the Constitution, provides 
procedure for Parliament to amend money Bills. This is set out in Section 77(3) and 
key provisions of the Act are the:  
 establishment of Parliamentary Appropriation Committees; 
 procedures before the introduction of the national budget;  
 the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement; 
 adopting a fiscal framework and revenue proposals;  
 introduction and passing of the Division of Revenue Bill and Appropriation Bill; 
 passing of revenue/taxation Bills; 
 changes mid-financial year: the National Adjustments Budget, revised fiscal 
framework, Adjustments Appropriation Bill and Division of Revenue Amendment 
Bill; and 
 the establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office. 
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According to this Act, each House of Parliament must establish a Committee on 
Finance and a Committee on Appropriations. On the one hand, the Committee on 
Finance deals with national macro-fiscal policy and amendments to the fiscal 
framework, revenue proposals and bills. On the other hand, the Committee on 
Appropriations deals with amendments to the Division of Revenue Bill, Appropriation 
Bill and other appropriation bills; it also deals with recommendations by the FFC and 
other parliamentary committees.  
2.8.4. Money Bills Amendment Act – Assessment of departments and reports 
The National Assembly (one of the two Houses of Parliament), through its Portfolio 
Committees, must annually assess the performance of each national department with 
reference to the medium-term estimates of expenditure; strategic priorities, 
measurable objectives, strategic plan; expenditure report published by National 
Treasury; financial statements; annual report and reports of the Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts; and other information before Parliament. This committee must 
thereafter table in the National Assembly a Budget Review and Recommendation 
(BRR) report for each department. This report must contain an assessment of the 
department’s service delivery performance, efficiency, productivity and its 
effectiveness subject to available resources, and it may make recommendations on 
the use of funds and their adequacy.  
2.8.5. Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act – Medium-
term budget policy statement 
The Budget Review and Recommendation (BRR) reports must be submitted to the 
National Assembly after the adoption of the Appropriation Bill and before the adoption 
of reports on the Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS). The Appropriation 
Bill is tabled by the Minister of Finance to the National Assembly along with other 
strategic documents such as the Budget Review, and the Estimates of National 
Expenditure during his budget speech, which is usually in February. After the tabling 
of this Bill, Portfolio Committees debate it and Parliament must approve the 
Appropriation Bill within four months of the beginning of the financial year. The MTBPS 
is tabled after six months to the new financial year; this is often in October. Therefore, 
this means that the BRR reports must be submitted to the National Assembly between 
the second or last month before the tabling of MTBPS. The proposed fiscal framework, 
explanation of macro-fiscal policy, macro projections and assumptions are referred to 
Committees on Finance. Committees on Finance must table reports on the fiscal 
framework, including amendments.  
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After the adoption of the fiscal framework, the Division of Revenue Bill is referred to 
the Committee on Appropriations for amendments, which must be consistent with the 
approved fiscal framework. Committees may not consider amendments to the 
Appropriation Bill until after the Division of Revenue Bill is passed and amendments 
must be consistent with the fiscal framework and the Division of Revenue Act. 
Parliamentary rules must provide for public hearings on Appropriation Bills. The 
proposed division of revenue and proposed conditional grants are referred to 
Committees on Appropriations. The Committees on Appropriations table reports on the 
proposed division of revenue, and conditional grant allocations, including amendments 
to the division of revenue. These must be submitted to Parliament at least three months 
before the budget. Upon adoption, these reports are submitted to the Minister of 
Finance and responsible members of Cabinet who then have to respond to the 
recommendations.  
2.8.6. Money Bills Amendment Act – National adjustments budget 
The national adjustments budget follows a similar consultative process with minor 
adjustments. The Adjustments Appropriation Bill and Division of Revenue Amendment 
Bill must be tabled at the same time, together with the amended fiscal framework, if 
required. The PFMA outlines what may be contained in the national adjustments 
budget, for example:  
 adjustments required due to significant and unforeseeable economic and 
financial events affecting fiscal targets set by the annual budget;  
 unforeseeable and unavoidable expenditure; and  
 roll-over of unspent funds from the previous year (section 30(2)).  
2.8.7. Money Bills Amendment Act – Introduction of bills and budgets (also 
requirements in Constitution 215(3) and Public Finance Management 
Act) 
The Minister of Finance must table the national annual budget at same time as the 
Appropriation Bill and Division of Revenue Bill. The budget must include:  
 a proposed three-year fiscal framework;  
 key macroeconomic assumptions;  
 tax and other revenue proposals for the financial year and two subsequent 
years;  
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 estimates of revenue and expenditure, differentiating between capital and 
current expenditure;  
 an estimate of aggregate general government and public sector debt levels in 
the short, medium and long term;  
 an estimate and breakdown of contingent liabilities for the financial year and two 
subsequent years;  
 estimates on interest and debt servicing charges and repayment on loans;  
 proposals for financing the anticipated deficit for the financial year; and an 
indication of intentions regarding borrowing and other forms of public liability that 
will increase public debt in the financial year and future years.  
2.8.8. Public Finance Management Act 
The PFMA and its Amendment (RSA, 1999) details the Financial Management 
Regulatory Framework for national and provincial government institutions. The local 
government sphere is regulated by a similar Act, the MFMA. Both these Acts are part 
of a broader strategy on improving financial management in the public sector with 
principles adopted from public expenditure management and in concordance with the 
constitution. The PFMA addresses the budgetary process, the institutional 
arrangements for procurement, the procedures, controls and the application of 
procurement methods, pre-requites for the issuance of government guarantees, and 
the intervention of the national government when a public entity fails to perform.  
In respect of budgetary oversight, the PFMA requires that Parliament and each 
Provincial Legislature appropriates money for each financial year. This is captured in 
section 26 of the Act. The Act also enables expenditure before the annual budget is 
passed, as seen in section 29, which stipulates that a department may not spend more 
than 45 percent of its budget before the budget has been passed. Reading this 
provision together with the provision outlined in the Money Bills and Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 2009, it follows that within the first 
four months of the new financial year each department may not spend more than 45 
percent of its budget. This is informed by the provision in both the PFMA and the Money 
Bills Amendment Act, which stipulates that Money Bills may be debated and amended 
by the legislature.  
Other key provisions from the PFMA include Section 43, which speaks to the process 
of virements and sets out the level of authority that is needed to shift funds between 
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and within departments. For instance, even though this Act gives department's power 
to manage their allocations, it also restricts the powers of accounting officers to move 
funds between programmes. In addition, if the department wants to shift more than 
eight percent from one programme, it requires approval from Parliament and it can only 
be done through the adjustment budget. In the case that the department wants to shift 
funds to increase transfer payments, it requires National Treasury's approval and it can 
be done at any point after Parliament has passed the bill. This Act is often qualified by 
the Treasury Regulations, which also have the force of law. Both the PFMA and the 
Treasury Regulations set clear reporting requirements for in-year budget execution, 
and budget and expenditure management, and require that the National Treasury 
publish monthly statements of actual revenue and expenditure with regard to the 
National Revenue Fund. These monthly statements are often referred to as Section 32 
reports.  
2.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a literature review in which public expenditure management 
practices were discussed. The existing literature suggests that there is a need to pay 
attention to the interaction between the three budget outcomes and the institutional 
arrangements within which they are embedded. It further suggests that fiscal stability 
creates an environment that encourages sound strategic prioritisation and this shared 
common goal promotes operational efficiency. By boosting operational and allocative 
efficiencies, everything staying the same, government should realise some savings 
which can be used to fund other priority areas, as opposed to accumulating more debt 
to fund these priorities. This would ensure aggregate fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the 
existing literature suggests that unless accountability measures are set in place by 
means of which people can be held accountable for their financial transgressions, it 
will be very difficult for a country to achieve the desirable budgetary outcomes. Within 
the South African context, the PFMA is legislation that promotes good financial 
management using the principles of public expenditure management.  
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CHAPTER 3 : AGGREGATE FISCAL DISCIPLINE  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter picks up on analysis of the budget, its processes and major role players. 
The chapter further looks at the characteristics of a credible budget and evaluates 
consolidated budgets of the national government departments, the main indicators 
analysed as well as the aggregate expenditure and revenue outturn compared to 
originally approved estimates. The next part of the chapter unpacks the shifting of 
funds during the financial year, as well as excessive expenditure in March. The chapter 
argues that the analysis of shifting funds serves as a good indicator for assessing the 
credibility of a budget. The key to this argument is an assessment on whether 
compliance is incentivised and non-compliance punished. While rewards are important 
in ensuring that government funds are spent sensibly on priority areas, it is necessary 
that punishment for non-compliance be applicable to institutions and individuals that 
compromise the credibility of government budgets.  
The criteria used to measure a budget's credibility is set out in the public expenditure 
management handbook. In addition, for a country’s budget to be considered credible, 
the public expenditure management handbook identifies five percent as the maximum 
variance in relation to the original approved budget. This applies to both the aggregate 
expenditure out-turns and the aggregate revenue out-turns.  
3.2. Purpose of the budget 
In a broader view, the budget is a key statement of policy by the government. It is 
characterised by three functions, which are:  
 spending, taxation and borrowing must support economic objectives;  
 resources must be allocated according to political priorities; and  
 budget and budget information must be tools to improve quality and effectiveness 
of spending.  
For both national and provincial government departments, the budget is allocated by 
votes, and relevant legislatures vote on passing the bill. However, the budget for each 
department must be comprehensive in covering the public sector, and it must include 
public agencies and donor receipts (both cash and in kind). All allocations for these 
institutions (public entities, non-profit institutions, private enterprises and households) 
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must flow through the departmental votes. This is to say that no individual allocation 
flows directly to these institutions; their allocation flows through a specific department 
that plays a leading role in the delivery of the sector priorities. In relation to donor 
funding, funds that flow from international organisations in support of specific 
programmes in the country are all centrally administered within the National Treasury. 
These funds have a separate account into which they are deposited, and each 
department can then access them from that account. Though they are administered in 
the National Treasury, they are planned and executed at a departmental and public 
entity level, with monthly reporting by the respective departments to the National 
Treasury for evaluations. The institutions with donor funding are compelled to disclose 
such agreements and commitments in the budget process.  
3.3. Role players in the budget process 
There are various role players in the budget process, which include both the 
administrative officials responsible for technical support and political figures for 
decision-making. The term “administrative officials” refers to the employees of the 
department, the accounting officer (Director General) and his/her team, while political 
figures are the executive authorities of departments (Ministers and their Deputies) and 
other members of Parliament. There are various key role players in the administration, 
particularly the high-level committees that make decisions on budget allocations. 
These committees are the Function/budget Group (FG), the Medium-Term 
Expenditure Committee (MTEC), and Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). The 
political committees involved are the Ministers’ Committee on the Budget 
(MinCommBud) and Cabinet.  
3.4. Function/budget group 
The budget is designed around the framework of function budgeting, which categorises 
expenditure based on the policy objectives that the expenditure is intended to achieve 
(National Treasury, 2014). Function groups contain all government institutions that 
contribute to achieving a particular function: national, provincial departments and the 
respective entities. These function groups are chaired by a Deputy Director General 
(DDG) of the National Treasury.  
 Function groups are generally subdivided into budget groups for purposes of 
discussion and engagement during the technical phase of the budget process.  
 Function groups are aligned with particular outcomes specified in the Medium-
Term Strategic Framework.  
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 This forum implies a discussion of the relationship between budget allocations 
and the design of policy frameworks, institutional arrangements and delivery 
models that seek to achieve a particular outcome.  
 Each function group leader must prepare an MTEC report and present the 
functional group recommendations to MTEC.  
The MTEC consists of Directors General (DGs) from various key departments such as 
the National Treasury, Department of Public Service Administration, Economic 
Development Department, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, and the 
Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluations. These senior-level officials 
evaluate the recommendations that come from technical group forums and make 
recommendations to the MinCommBud. The technical group forums consist of the 
DDGs of the departments (this function is often delegated to chief directors) that form 
MTEC and various DGs from line departments arranged by function. The function 
group forums are chaired by the DG of the National Treasury. The MTEC makes 
recommendations to the MinCommBud on how best to fund government programmes, 
how much goes to each sphere, and how revenue will be raised and allocations made 
per national department. This committee is chaired by the DG of the National Treasury.  
The MinCommBud is a committee of ministers from the departments that form the 
MTEC. These ministers evaluate the MTEC recommendations, and make final 
recommendations to Cabinet on the fiscal framework and how funds are allocated per 
sphere and national departments. The Minister of Finance then tables these 
recommendations to the Cabinet/National Assembly for deliberations and 
endorsement. This committee is chaired by the Minister of the National Treasury.  
The Financial and Fiscal Commission is a constitutional institution established in terms 
of section 6 of the constitution. The FFC makes recommendations and advises organs 
of state on financial and fiscal matters. The Constitution states that the FFC is 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and must be impartial.  
According to the Constitution, the Appropriations Bill may only be passed once the 
recommendations of the FFC have been considered. Cabinet therefore bases its 
decisions on the recommendations of both the FFC and the MinCommBud. Cabinet 
consists of the President, the Deputy President and his Ministers and the cabinet 
approves allocations. Thereafter, these allocations are signed by the Minister of 
Finance and sent to various departments inclusive of the provision for earmarking 
certain amounts or set conditions. This often happens in late November. Once these 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
27 
allocations have been sent out to various departments, the ministers of departments 
are required to issue allocation letters to various public entities notifying them of their 
respective final allocations and thereafter the budget documents are prepared.  
The National Treasury is responsible for putting together the documents; however, it 
obtains inputs from various departments and government institutions. The documents 
used in preparation for the main budget are: Budget Review, Division of Revenue Bill, 
Appropriation Bill, Estimates of National Expenditure, and Peoples’ Guide to the 
Budget. All these documents are tabled by the Minister of Finance in the budget speech 
in February. Below is a brief outline of what each of these documents contains.  
 Budget Review  
o Economic outlook  
o Fiscal framework  
o Tax policy  
o Assets and liabilities  
o Summary of medium term expenditure and division of resources  
 Division of Revenue Bill  
o Division of revenue among the three spheres of government for first year 
of MTEF cycle  
o Conditions on certain types of expenditure  
 Appropriation Bill  
o Appropriation for the first year of the MTEF cycle by vote and economic 
classification  
o Amounts exclusively appropriated  
 Estimates of National Expenditure  
o Explanatory memoranda to the Appropriation Bill  
o Policy developments and service delivery achievements and commitments 
alongside seven-year numbers. Includes information on public entities  
 Peoples’ Guide  
o A popular version of the main points in the budget in various indigenous 
languages  
Once the main budget is tabled, parliamentary processes have to take place. These 
processes were discussed in Chapter 2 under the legislative requirement and they are 
briefly outlined below:  
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3.5. Parliamentary processes 
 Individual portfolio committees consider the budget and strategic plan for each 
department. 
 The budget is considered by standing committees on finance and appropriations 
comprising members of both houses.  
 The Fiscal Framework is approved/amended, then the Division of Revenue and 
then the Appropriation Bill.  
 In respect of the MTBPS, reports are issued by Parliament on the medium-term 
expenditure framework’s fiscal framework and division of revenue, before the 
executive finalises the budget.  
 Parliamentary Committees table the Budgetary Review and Recommendation 
Reports (BRRR). 
 The National Budget tabled includes response to BRRRs, MTBPS Fiscal 
Framework and Division of Revenue. 
 The National Treasury briefs Parliamentary Committees on the documents/ bills 
tabled at different points in the Budget cycle.  
 The National Treasury provides quarterly expenditure reports to Parliamentary 
Committees.  
 The Public Accounts Committee deals with post-facto issues raised by the 
Auditor-General. 
3.6. Adjusted budget 
Once Parliament has passed the Appropriation Bill for the main budget, departments 
may revise these allocations through a secondary in-year budget process referred to 
as the adjustments budget. The Public Finance Management Act, Act 1 of 1999 (RSA, 
1999), section 30(2), states that the adjustments budget may provide for:  
 Significant and unforeseeable economic and financial events affecting the fiscal 
targets;  
 Unforeseeable and unavoidable expenditure recommended by a committee of 
Cabinet;  
 Any expenditure in terms of section 16, which governs the use of funds in 
emergency situations;  
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 Money to be appropriated for expenditure already announced by the Minister 
during the tabling of the annual budget. In certain instances, an amount to be 
allocated for the three years of the MTEF period for a specific purpose will be 
announced by the Minister when the main budget is tabled, but the details of the 
annual allocations are only decided on at a later stage.  
 The shifting of funds between and within votes;  
 Utilisation of savings under a main division of a vote to defray over-expenditure 
on another main division in terms of section 43, which governs the use of 
virements;  
 The roll-over of unspent funds from the preceding financial year;  
 Unforeseeable and unavoidable allocations can only be made if there is evidence 
that by the time the allocations were made (main budget) there was no way of 
pre-empting the need to budget for this expenditure.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 under virements, the department may shift funds between 
votes only during the adjustments budget. The circumstance under which this happens 
is when the function of one department shifts to another department in-year. Rollovers 
refer to unspent funds from the previous financial year for which there is proof of 
commitment through either an invoice, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or a 
service-level agreement (SLA). This section is guided by section 30 of the PFMA and 
regulation 6.4 of Treasury regulations. The adjustment budget is accompanied by a 
number of documents. These documents are MTBPS, the Division of Revenue 
Amendment Bill, the Adjustments Appropriation Bill, the Adjusted Estimates of National 
Expenditure, and the Peoples’ Guide to the Budget. The Minister of Finance tables all 
these documents during the adjustment budget speech in October. Below is a brief 
outline of what each of these documents contains:  
 Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement  
 Key priorities  
 Economic outlook and fiscal framework  
 Medium-term expenditure framework  
 Division of revenue between the three spheres, including the allocation to 
conditional allocations  
 Division of Revenue Amendment Bill  
 Amendments of current year allocations to provinces and municipalities  
 Adjustments Appropriation Bill  
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 Adjustments to current year appropriations originally tabled in February by vote 
and economic classification  
 Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure  
 Explanatory memoranda to the Adjustments Appropriation Bill  
 Specify adjustments in respect of each category of expenditure adjustment 
permitted in terms of section 30(2) of the PFMA.  
All budget documentation for both the main budget and the adjusted budget are 
available on the National Treasury website.  
3.7. Deciding the revenue envelope 
The budget process involves making decisions around how much should be raised and 
how much should be spent. Within the South African context, revenue must be 
considered alongside expenditure, in order to determine a consolidated picture of 
government operations and to ensure fiscal sustainability of government finances. 
Therefore, spending will need to respond to revenue projections. Government revenue 
is typically directed to a common revenue pool, the National Revenue Fund (NRF), 
before it is distributed. In deciding the revenue envelope, the revenue analysis working 
committee works out how much revenue goes into the NRF. There are main two 
sources of revenue: Tax revenue and Non-tax revenue. The latter refers to the revenue 
received by the South African government as a result of administrative charges, licence 
fees, sales of goods and services, while the former refers to all forms of taxes (income, 
company, property taxes and so on). 
The revenue analysis working committee consisting of the National Treasury (NT), the 
South African Revenue Services (SARS), the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and 
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) meets regularly to determine revenue projections for 
the MTEF. This committee is mandated to determine revenue projections for the 
MTEF, and discusses and debates trends in tax revenue, and form a consensus view 
on the revenue outlook for the new MTEF.  
When making decisions about revenue, the committee considers multiple factors 
because of the importanceof tax revenue for economic performance. Analysis into the 
South African tax revenue over the past years highlights that as far back as 1995/96 
to 1999/2000 nominal gross tax revenues grew at an annual average rate of 12.1 
percent. This was very high, as the average inflation rate during the same period was 
six percent (National Treasury, 2012). According to the National Treasury, the high 
growth allowed the state to increase expenditure. In addition, from 2001, revenue 
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performance accelerated, buoyed by strong commodity prices and improved tax 
administration, with growth rates in excess of 17 percent after 2004. However, revenue 
declined by 4.2 percent in 2009/10 as a result of the global financial crisis and a drop 
in the growth rate (National Treasury, 2012).  
3.8. Nominal growth in gross tax revenue and GDP, 
1995/96 – 2013/14  
Figure 3.1 below shows the growth of tax revenue and GDP between the 1995/1996 
and 2013/2014 financial years. 
 
Figure 3.1: Tax revenue vs GDP 
 
There is a positive correlation between these variables. In the 2009/2010 financial 
year, tax revenue decreased sharply owing to the global economic recession. While 
there was a decrease in GDP growth, GDP was kept at five percent year-on-year 
growth by an increase in government’s expenditure. Figure 3.1 also shows that 
although tax revenue has been increasing year on year after the recession, this 
revenue is yet to reach the levels it achieved prior to the recession. Given the slow 
growth in revenues, there is a need to stabilise expenditure until such time that revenue 
has recovered fully. This can be done through setting up an expenditure ceiling, cutting 
down on government programmes and eliminating waste in the system.  
An expenditure ceiling refers to an overall restriction on the outcome of all or most 
government expenditure. It is established ahead of the budget preparation period. It is 
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as an instrument to enforce aggregate expenditure discipline. The process of setting 
the ceiling before the negotiations guides the preparation and execution of the budget. 
Setting an expenditure ceiling is a necessity and aids in avoiding the tendency to 
expand the size of government expenditure without a corresponding increase in 
revenue. This is evident in cases of fiscal deterioration in many countries due to 
imprudent government spending. Establishing a ceiling as opposed to a baseline aids 
in fostering fiscal discipline and formalised restrictions on aggregate expenditure. This 
ceiling can be a valuable component of a framework intended to promote fiscal 
sustainability. However, some considerations regarding an expenditure ceiling are 
necessary. A balance must be struck between the ambition to enforce expenditure 
discipline and allowing for justified variations in expenditures, including:  
 The impact of inflation; and  
 Unexpected expenditure. 
Setting of ceilings is not a homogeneous process as it is largely dependent on the 
context of fiscal, economic, and political conditions. As such, the principles for 
establishing the expenditure ceilings need to be explicitly linked with other fiscal 
objectives. Fiscal policy responds differently to different needs and this can be seen 
from how government has responded to the crises of the past two decades. Below is 
a snapshot of how the South African government responded to the crises of the past 
two decades:  
The 1989-1993 recession is often referred to as the most severe recession 
experienced by South Africa. In responding to it, the government of the time applied 
fiscal policy responses that were expansionary, resulting in large deficits. Expanding 
government expenditure is still in line with the current government principles of fiscal 
policy, which states that government increases expenditure during downturns. 
However, the much-increased expenditure was a politically motivated expenditure and 
was aggravated further by limited political legitimacy to increase tax revenue further 
(Van Der Merwe, 1993).  
With the new government coming into power in 1994, fiscal responses between 1993 
and 1996 introduced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
strategy, which was also expansionary in nature. The higher public spending was seen 
as an important element of growth. The RDP was driven by a need to begin addressing 
historical inequalities. However, efforts to meet basic needs were counteracted by the 
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accelerated wage bill. Due to the expansionary fiscal policy, the deficit remained 
stubbornly high.  
Between 1997 and 2004, the South African government introduced the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, a macroeconomic policy informed by 
the need to stabilise the economy. In order to implement GEAR, various expenditure 
reforms were introduced to ensure prudent fiscal management, including expenditure 
cuts in education, economic services and health. These were complemented by efforts 
to increase revenue. As a result, between 2005 and 2008, South Africa had a healthy 
GDP growth and started accumulating budget surpluses in 2006 and 2007. This strong 
economic base led to exceptional revenue performance, resulting in room to increase 
expenditure. However, this was short-lived as the global economic crises struck in the 
2008/09 financial year, leaving South Africa vulnerable (Alam, Mokate & Plangemann. 
2016).  
During the recession, South Africa was still able to increase its expenditure owing to 
the surpluses accumulated in the years preceding the recession. However, the risks to 
the fiscus began to materialise towards the end of 2012. It was during this time that 
discussions of setting expenditure ceilings started to materialise and a decision to set 
a spending limit in the 2012 Budget was made. Establishing a spending limit meant 
that should there be a need for additional funding, funds would be sourced from within 
the institutions’ baselines through expenditure reductions. The financial year 2013/14 
was an exception, as the breach of the ceiling was due to the R7.9 billion 
recapitalisation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to drive its focus 
on infrastructure funding (National Treasury, 2015a). This forced government to 
exceed its ceiling. Questions remain unanswered on whether the expenditure ceilings 
are going to be a unilateral government commitment or whether there is scope for it to 
be translated into legislation. While the latter ensures accountability, the former 
requires discipline and strong institutions for enforcement.  
While the expenditure ceiling is critical for fiscal sustainability, there are a number of 
variables that can be used to measure this and they all fall under two main broad 
variables, income and expenditure at an aggregate level. These indicators provide 
regulators with reliable early warning signs of trouble. On the one hand, “aggregate 
expenditure out-turn” refers to the consolidated government expenditure at all levels. 
This spending is financed from the National Revenue Fund. On the other hand, 
“aggregate revenue out-turn” refers to the consolidated government revenue raised 
into the NRF. It includes all forms of taxes and receipts raised by both provincial and 
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national departments. Before going into the details about the factors that underlie fiscal 
sustainability, it is important to test whether the estimates being made do in fact bear 
a resemblance to the actual outcomes at the end of each financial year. This is referred 
to as fiscal discipline, the most important outcome in the budget process. It helps to 
answer questions and renders credibility to the budget.  
Table 3.1: Aggregate expenditure outcome compared to expenditure estimates 
 
Table 3.1 explicitly depicts the variance between the aggregate expenditure outcome 
and the expenditure estimates, being R21 billion, R14 billion, R4 billion and R13 billion 
in 2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15 respectively. In other words, this table 
shows that while government projected to spend R973 billion in 2011/12, at the end of 
the financial year it actually spent R952 billion. This indicate that government is not 
precisely on point with its projections, which therefore means that the fiscal discipline 
outcome has not been met. This is also evident from the revenue projections, which 
show marginal differences between the estimated revenue and the actual revenue as 
depicted in Table 3.2.  
The researcher is of the opinion that Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 provide a peculiar picture 
of the government contradicting itself, for the reason that in all the financial years under 
review, the expenditure estimates were much higher than the revenue estimates, 
which effectively means that the accumulation of debt is built into the system. It must 
be noted though that this is not unusual for a developing country with a variety of 
needs. However, a budget deficit of 3-4 per cent is accepted as being reasonable. This 
financial management poses a serious threat to the stability of the economy, as 
highlighted by the extensive available literature indicating that the accumulation of debt 
is unsustainable. In support of this view, Zagler and Dürnecker state that fiscal policies 
need to remain sustainable, because if the fiscal policies are not sustainable, this will 
become a source of macroeconomic instability (Zagler & Dürnecker, 2003). Tanzi also 
found that public debt has an adverse effect on the growth of the economy. 
Furthermore, Checherita and Rother found that high levels of public debt are likely to 
be deleterious for growth (Checherita & Rother, 2010).  
Expenditure in R billions 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Expenditure estimates 973 1058 1149 1252
Actual expenditure 952 1045 1145 1239
Variance 21 13 4 13
Variance % 2.2% 1.2% 0.3% 1.0%
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Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show that there is a need to adequately increase revenue to 
levels where it covers the projected expenditure. This will ensure that fiscal 
sustainability is maintained. Fiscal sustainability is a necessary condition for fiscal 
discipline.  
Table 3.2: Aggregate revenue outcome compared to original approved budget  
 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that expenditure has been more than revenue in both 
estimates and actuals. This is likely to drive South Africa onto an unsustainable 
trajectory if it is not controlled. In addition to this, heavy reliance on tax revenue to 
sustain the economy is not encouraged, more so since tax revenue makes up 
approximately 90 percent of budget revenue. A high effective tax rate on corporate and 
individual income could hamper the rate of private investment. For this reason, low 
disposable income might increase the revenue base for the government; however, the 
negative side effects could have more detrimental effects on growth and the perception 
of the fairness and equity effects of the tax system. This could lead to tax avoidance 
and tax evasion if people perceive the system as being unjust.  
There is a sufficient body of knowledge suggesting that an increase in the rate of tax 
interferes with private decisions to invest and investment is a key variable for economic 
growth. Zagler & Dürnecker (2003 as cited in Moreno-Dodson, 2013) explain that high 
taxation on earnings can have a negative impact on the quality of labour input. This is 
mainly due to the expectation that new knowledge and skills lead to higher future 
earnings. Optimality of schooling decisions implies that marginal benefits (in terms of 
higher future earnings) are equal to marginal costs. If tuition costs are kept constant, 
then a tax on labour income will induce individuals to cut back on their efforts to obtain 
schooling, thereby reducing the average quality of the workforce, with a detrimental 
effect on growth.  
In 2013, the then Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, appointed the Davis Tax 
Committee to review the South African tax system. The committeepointed out that at 
24.6 percent South Africa’s current tax to GDP ratio was somewhat higher than the 
average observed in high-growth economies of 22.5 percent. It recommended that 
Revenue in R billions 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Revenue estimates 830 906 1011 1099
Actual revenue 837 909 1008 1102
Variance -7 -3 3 -3
Variance % -0.8% -0.3% 0.3% -0.3%
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South Africa reduce this ratio from the current 24.6 percent of GDP to the region of 22 
percent (Bisseker, 2014). This report also cites a 2008 University of Pretoria study 
which found that in order to maximise economic growth, South Africa’s optimal tax 
base should be approximately 19 percent. These two views are further complemented 
by the Katz Commission (1994), which recommended that South Africa targets tax 
revenue to GDP ratio of 25 percent.  
Having established that the tax revenue is high, the third dilemma is how to increase 
other revenue sources that are likely to replace the tax revenue. There is, therefore, a 
need to promote innovative financial management to incentivise robust revenue 
generation to decrease the fiscal deficit. Fiscal deficit is the term used to refer to the 
gap between taxation and expenditure. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show that the fiscal deficit 
is increasing, a fiscal trajectory that may be unsustainable in the sense that the debt-
to-GDP ratio is deteriorating (as seen in Table 3.3). This does not allow the government 
to reduce debt to a level that enables a robust countercyclical response to future 
crises.  
3.9. Debts as a percentage of GDP 
In order to qualify for full membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
governments must meet the Maastricht Treaty’s fiscal requirements of a government 
debt-to-GDP norm of 60 percent and budget deficit-to-GDP norm of three percent. 
These fiscal rules are part of the Stability and Growth Pact and were accepted as 
norms of good fiscal behaviour (Calitz, Du Plessis & Siebrits, 2013). However, the 
South African government’s gross debt is 47 percent of GDP (National Treasury, 
2015a). This is still within the Maastricht norm of 60 percent of GDP; however, an 
examination of the trends that have developed over the past seven years indicates that 
this is yet another reason to be more concerned. Table 3.3 below shows that it will not 
be long before South African debt to GDP exceeds the Maastricht norm of 60 percent.  
Dunn (2013) devised a forecasting formula that can be used for linear trend estimation 
which rests on two properties, namely ∑(Y - Yt) = 0; ∑(Y - Yt)^2 = a minimum (least) 
value.  
The formula is as follows:  
Yt = a + b(x)  
where 
Yt = the trend value for a given year  
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a = the value of Yt when x=0  
b = the slope of the trend line representing the change in Yt for each unit of time  
x = the coded time value for any year, as determined by its distance from the origin"  
Table 3.3: Forecasted gross debt as % of GDP 
 
 General government gross debt as % of GDP in 2024: 60.325 
Where  Coded Time Value (x)= 13.5    
 Coded Time Value squared (x^2)=  182.25  
 a 31.075     
 b 2.167     
 therefore Yt 60.32481408     
       
Using Dunn’s (2013) forecasting technique, with everything staying the same; in the 
next 10 years (by 2024) the debt to GDP levels will have reached 60.3 percent, 
surpassing the Maastricht norm of 60 percent. Therefore, if the government continues 
on this trajectory, this is the likely scenario, but things could get worse should 
government expenditure increase or should there be another recession.  
3.10. Debt-service cost as a percentage of GDP 
Another way to look at the status quo is by calculating the debt service cost to GDP 
ratio. The debt service cost to GDP ratio is the level of interest payment on debt per 
year as a percentage of GDP and has been steadily increasing over the last few years. 
It increased from 2.3 percent in 2009/10 to three percent in 2014/15, as reflected in 
Table 3.4. The World Bank through the Maastricht Treaty Stability and Growth Pact 
has set three percent as the maximum acceptable level of debt service cost to GDP. 
And, given the steady increase of debt service cost to GDP over the last six years, it is 
Year General 
government 
gross debt as 








Trend value for 
General government 
gross debt as % of 
GDP (Yt)
2007 28.331 -3.5 -99.1585 24.5 23.491
2008 27.232 -2.5 -68.08 12.5 25.658
2009 31.579 -1.5 -47.3685 4.5 27.825
2010 35.313 -0.5 -17.6565 0.5 29.991
2011 38.82 0.5 19.41 0.5 32.158
2012 42.091 1.5 63.1365 4.5 34.325
2013 45.231 2.5 113.0775 12.5 36.491
2014 47.302 3.5 165.557 24.5 38.658
n=8 248.597 0 128.9175 59.5 248.597
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likely that South Africa will soon exceed the three percent set norm. To bring this into 
context, in his MTBPS speech in 2015, the then Finance Minister Nene stated that 
GDP growth prospects had been revised further to 1.3 percent (Nene, 2015).  
Table 3.4: Growth in debt service cost 
 
The improvement in the debt service cost as a percentage of GDP is highly dependent 
on the growth prospects to improve the economic outlook of the country’s finances. 
Current outlook suggests that this is an optimistic view; in reality the GDP figures are 
likely to be much lower than they were initially projected and this could mean the 
situation is much worse than it is currently reflected. In a report by the IMF on the World 
Economic Outlook in the October 2015 update, South Africa’s growth projections were 
trimmed by a significant 0.6 and 0.8 percentage points for 2015 and 2016, respectively, 
to 1.4 percent and 1.3 percent due to electricity load-shedding and other supply 
bottlenecks, and work-force strikes in various industries. Growth for Sub-Saharan 
Africa (a key trading partner for South Africa) is projected at 3.8 percent in 2015 and 
4.3 percent in 2016, lower than the five percent growth in 2014. This poses downside 
risk to the South African economic growth.  
3.11. Debt service cost as a percentage of expenditure 
Another way to look at the status quo is by calculating the debt service cost as a 
percentage of total expenditure. This is the level of interest payment on debt per year 
as a percentage of consolidated expenditure. Debt service cost as a percentage of 
total consolidated expenditure grew from 7.6 percent in 2009/10 to 10.1 percent in 
2014/15, an average annual increase of six percent over the six-year period. This is 
below the 10.1 percent of growth in debt service cost as shown in Table 3.4. This debt 
pattern affects the country’s long-term positive prospects. This suggests that the debt 
will continue to increase over the next few years. If one considers South Africa’s 
counter-cyclicality principle, which basically means that the budget balance should be 
set to counteract variations in the business cycle and build fiscal space during good 
times to enable a response to shocks and recession, it therefore follows that when the 
economy goes into recession, government will again have to step in to rescue the 
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Debt Service Cost 57 129 66 227 76460 88 121 101 185 115 016
As % of GDP 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.8 3
As % expenditure 7.6 8.2 8.6 9.1 9.7 10.1
As % revenue 9.9 9.9 10.3 11 11.4 12.1
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situation. This will effectively mean more government spending while revenue levels 
are unlikely to increase because of the likely job losses that come with recessions. 
Consequently, this results in more debt, which leads to increased debt costs to the 
detriment of the poorest of the poor, while future generations will have to bear the 
burden of paying interest on the debt that they did not incur.  
Table 3.5: Debt service cost time series forecast 
 
Debt service cost as % of GDP in 2030:  16.413 
Coded Time Value (x)= 19.5    
Coded Time Value squared (x^2)=  380.25  
a 6.663     
b 0.500     
therefore Yt 16.4125     
 
Using Dunn’s (2013) forecasting technique, it can be inferred that large amounts of 
money are being spent on paying government debt and it is forecasted that in the next 
15 years debt service costs would have soared to 16.4 percent of expenditure.  
Year Debt Service 









Trend value for Debt 
Service Cost as % of 
total expenditure (Yt)
2009 7.6 -2.5 -19 6.25 5.413
2010 8.2 -1.5 -12.3 2.25 5.913
2011 8.6 -0.5 -4.3 0.25 6.413
2012 9.1 0.5 4.55 0.25 6.913
2013 9.7 1.5 14.55 2.25 7.413
2014 10.1 2.5 25.25 6.25 7.913
n=6 53.3 0 8.75 17.5 39.975
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Table 3.6: Expenditure by function 
 
South Africa is expected to honour the obligation of paying debt service costs; that is, 
the interest on the debt South Africa has each financial year. This means that debt 
service costs are the first direct charge from the revenue generated. There is a need 
to increase the fiscal space through reducing debt service costs. Table 3.6, adapted 
from the 2015 budget review, shows that the size of debt service cost is double that of 
Post-School Education and Training. However, the situation is more dire when one 
considers the base of the employment and social security function, which was R56.4 
billion in 2014/15, half the debt service costs in the financial year. Table 3.6 also shows 
that the debt service costs are the fastest growing expenditure item by 10.1 percent 
over the 2015 MTEF.  
3.12. Debt to revenue 
The ratio of debt to revenue is an important indicator that shows how debt compares 
to the revenue in a particular year. In 2014/15, the ratio of public debt to revenue was 
12.1 percent (see Table 3.7). Put differently, 12.1 percent of South Africa's revenue 
was used to pay off the debt service costs in 2014/15. This is the portion of revenue 
that could have been used elsewhere to finance government services, which would 
have increased growth. A perpetual concern around government’s borrowing is that it 
diverts funds from the private sector, where they may be utilised more productively to 
service unproductive expenditure, such as the one for debt service cost. To put this in 
Consolidated government expenditure by function,1 2014/15 – 2017/18






Basic education 189 454    203 468    216 036    227 816    16.7% 6.3%
Health 144 558    157 294    167 485    177 525    13.0% 7.1%
Defence, public order and safety 163 018    171 150    181 248    192 719    14.1% 5.7%
Post-school education and
training
56 612      62 238      65 556      69 594      5.1% 7.1%
Economic affairs 189 430    206 164    219 526    225 549    16.8% 6.0%
Employment, labour affairs and social 
security funds
56 439      64 138      70 111      72 945      5.3% 8.9%
Local development and social 
infrastructure
176 612    199 570    210 235    223 813    16.3% 8.2%
General public services 64 743      64 385      66 750      69 824      5.2% 2.6%
Social protection 143 926    155 297    165 997    176 523    12.8% 7.0%
Allocated by function 1 128 354 1 219 566 1 292 833 1 363 364 100.0% 6.5%
Debt-service costs 115 016    126 440    140 971    153 376    10.1%
Unallocated reserves –               5 000        15 000      45 000      
Consolidated expenditure 1 243 370 1 351 007 1 448 804 1 561 740 7.9%
1. Consisting of the main budget and spending by provinces, public entities and social security funds financed from 
    own revenue
Percentage 
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context, the government takes funds from the private sector through taxes to fund the 
ever increasing debt service costs. This is revenue that could arguably have been used 
productively by the private sector in investments with a potential to grow the economy. 
This effect of debt is known as the crowding-out effect.  
Table 3.3 shows that South Africa’s debt increased significantly in response to the 
global financial crisis, which saw government finance expenditure through higher 
borrowing (as denoted by the increase in the debt to GDP ratio). As the debt increased, 
the cost of raising additional debt also rose. This is due to the deteriorating outlook as 
expressed by the rating agencies, as South Africa has become a risky country to lend 
to. The two variables of income and expenditure that influence the fiscal sustainability 
have been discussed in great depth above. However, the trajectory of public debt is 
influenced by factors other than revenue and expenditure. Interest rates determine how 
quickly debt accumulates and the growth of national income defines the debt that can 
be sustainably held. If interest rates are broadly in line with economic growth, the debt 
path depends on the gap between the government’s revenue and non-interest 
spending, known as the primary balance. The bigger the fiscal deficit gap, the more 
government is on an unsustainable expenditure path and the interest rate of 
government bonds will increase. This will gradually weaken the country’s debt-
servicing ability and accelerate the increase in government’s financing costs. Growing 
interest on government debt will create pressures to cut expenditure. This will further 
strengthen the calls for an expenditure ceiling. The reality is that interest rates have 
been growing by more than the economic growth owing to weaker markets.  
In short, major new policy initiatives such as the nuclear power or expanded post – 
secondary education require a significant expansion of the fiscal envelope. If the 
economy grows more rapidly, these programmes will be financially feasible without 
major adjustments in tax revenue. However, this is unlikely, given the low forecasted 
economic growth. Indeed, the key provisions of the National Development Plan will be 
fiscally sustainable if the higher growth rate of five percent envisaged in the plan is 
achieved. If the economy does not grow faster, implementing these programmes, while 
ensuring fiscal sustainability, will require a commensurate reduction in other areas of 
spending or a substantial increase in taxes.  
Therefore, South Africa faces complex and difficult fiscal choices in the coming year 
and the consequences of these choices will endure for decades. Government 
programmes that are likely to worsen the fiscal unsustainability include the National 
Health Insurance (NHI), which requires R71.9 billion, the post-education programme, 
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which is costed at R120 billion, and the nuclear deal, which is costed at R385 billion 
(Department of Health, 2015; Eskom, 2013; Department of Higher Education and 
Training, 2016).  
The country’s fiscal future is at risk and efforts to implement the National Development 
Plan hang in the balance unless wise choices are made. If wise choices are not put in 
place, South Africa might fall into a debt trap. These choices will have to be made at 
policy formulation level and at national department level. Thus, it is important to 
examine the contribution of national government to the fiscal discipline of government’s 
finances.  
3.13. Expenditure vs original expenditure estimates by department 
Annual budget decisions have consequences for the current budget year and beyond 
the subsequent three years. The provision of new social services creates an implicit 
obligation to offer these services well into the future. A budget is therefore a process 
through which choices have to be made about competing government priorities. When 
these budget decisions are made, a genuine expectation is that each department will 
spend the funds as allocated through the Appropriations Bill. However, this seldom 
happens as departments never spend 100 percent of their allocated budgets. To obtain 
a measure of how each department performed in terms of the expenditure vs the 
original expenditure estimates, an analysis of the variance between expenditure 
estimates and actual expenditure by department was performed. The outcomes are 
presented in Table 3.7.  





Table 3.7: Spending by national departments 
 
National Sphere












The Presidency 819 793 907 590 1 020 689 984 689 1 095 685 1 033 107 1 180 820 623 672
Parliament 1 674 902 1 565 103 1 763 414 1 684 594 1 873 138 1 814 052 1 989 176 1 853 691
Home Affairs 5 464 134 5 655 301 5 296 269 5 103 246 6 567 769 6 992 552 6 623 702 7 223 327
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 47 933 580 46 221 012 54 715 590 53 442 919 58 252 691 56 401 573 63 212 720 59 474 688
Public Works 7 819 256 7 061 448 7 993 796 7 327 478 6 170 036 6 022 654 6 121 320 6 024 627
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 75 790 92 841 174 159 160 235 192 745 191 727 733 842 709 794
Women, Children and People w ith Disabilities 117 943 165 852 172 191 179 889 198 312 187 328 183 134
International Relations and Cooperation 4 796 768 5 022 008 5 116 591 5 193 791 5 548 390 5 871 631 5 754 324 5 984 703
Social Services
Arts and Culture 2 468 577 2 455 890 2 685 657 2 656 471 2 914 777 2 755 220 3 524 748 3 475 679
Basic Education 13 868 134 12 884 651 16 343 578 14 801 405 17 591 905 17 011 375 19 680 146 19 569 252
Health 25 731 554 25 713 968 27 557 018 27 894 418 30 706 722 29 825 579 33 955 475 33 154 655
Higher Education and Training 37 377 301 38 306 939 41 106 505 43 276 894 46 725 391 46 422 154 50 306 681 50 704 220
Labour 1 981 458 2 007 122 2 119 726 2 034 568 2 415 247 2 371 444 2 527 292 2 420 494
Social Development 104 732 697 103 139 181 112 216 761 111 115 938 120 491 600 117 084 948 128 799 378 127 819 415
Sport and Recreation South Africa 802 690 810 612 848 424 1 053 880 1 073 485 1 072 806 970 404 967 384
Financial and Administrator Services
Government Communication and Information System 496 393 421 215 429 095 397 224 396 740 440 913 413 069 424 652
National Treasury 396 242 839 398 136 050 429 036 260 431 195 727 472 483 181 474 841 925 514 823 770 513 946 358
Public Enterprises 230 231 346 115 1 249 072 1 367 054 236 889 272 467 259 786 298 175
Public Service and Administration 690 069 645 469 731 487 703 712 816 371 809 103 875 074 809 183
Statistics South Africa 3 240 909 3 674 462 1 721 604 1 761 652 1 737 704 1 729 530 2 242 514 2 156 435
Justice and Protection Services
Correctional Services 16 559 196 15 870 080 17 732 188 17 311 816 18 748 074 18 700 511 19 721 111 19 592 628
Defence and Military Veterans 37 492 954 37 704 900 40 243 343 40 447 521 42 831 234 42 834 012
Independent Police Investigative Directorate 196 961 171 448 216 991 193 141 234 719 232 404
Justice and Constitutional Development 13 517 653 13 611 474 15 481 477 15 079 997 16 709 945 16 030 114 17 892 137 17 395 325
Police 58 061 537 57 933 121 62 485 359 63 156 593 67 917 118 68 791 398 72 507 243 72 507 225
Economic Services and Infrastructure
Economic Development 594 540 577 602 672 732 673 473 771 466 771 431 696 860 694 908
Energy 6 089 902 6 174 255 6 805 903 6 658 984 6 598 172 6 477 240 7 415 639 6 220 112
Environmental Affairs 2 846 063 4 108 559 4 512 161 4 942 661 5 431 156 5 200 306 5 668 386 5 675 059
Mineral Resources 1 036 212 1 029 425 1 169 062 1 173 642 1 393 849 1 387 219 1 471 291 1 475 249
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 4 719 741 4 928 991 5 798 772 5 813 233 6 177 987 6 111 313 6 692 383 6 613 526
Communications 1 889 112 1 791 960 1 712 339 1 651 211 2 043 917 2 362 782 1 593 427 2 181 677
Rural Development and Land Reform 8 124 246 7 997 740 8 877 566 8 919 567 9 459 740 9 454 056 9 455 305 9 395 783
Science and Technology 4 404 618 4 403 472 4 955 930 4 973 314 6 198 155 6 169 489 6 470 190 6 389 044
Tourism 1 242 876 1 250 245 1 367 321 1 371 959 1 500 574 1 512 667 1 662 110 1 557 615
Trade and Industry 6 786 896 6 801 046 9 092 055 8 286 434 9 572 580 9 380 302 9 835 029 9 785 297
Transport 35 084 013 41 196 530 38 828 952 39 328 215 42 275 340 43 033 773 48 726 518 49 147 247
Water and Sanitation 9 936 225 8 244 476 8 812 661 8 641 507 10 186 963 10 247 721 12 480 332 11 618 514
Human Settlements 22 578 495 22 596 671 25 263 180 24 497 782 28 110 463 27 702 990 30 521 392 29 358 513
Grand Total 884 792 908 888 234 616 963 555 459 962 692 521 1 051 044 611 1 047 126 062 1 139 869 547 1 130 497 676
2011_12 2012_13 2013_14 2014_15
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Table 3.3 shows the original budget versus the actual expenditure outcome for national 
departments between 2011/12 and 2014/15. Using the five percent as the benchmark 
for credibility, one can already see that there is a lack of consistency with regard to 
staying within the five percent variance. There are two existing anomalies, the 
Departments of Public Enterprises and of Women, Children and People with 
Disabilities have overspent by over the five percent threshold, which signifies that the 
budgets for these two institutions are not credible. The Department of Public 
Enterprises has overspent by an average of 22 percent on its original budget. This 
highlights poor financial management and poor planning.  
3.14. Excessive expenditure in March 
The “Excessive Expenditure in March” report is an analysis of the National March 
Expenditure. Cross-tabulation analysis methods are applied to disaggregate the data 
further and identify economic classification items that departments tend to spend on 
excessively. The data on this report is based on records extracted from the Basic 
Accounting System (BAS), which is the financial system used by most departments in 
the national and provincial spheres of government. Expenditure items that exhibit 
regular evenly spread spending trends due to being of a fixed nature, executed or 
made by approved payment schedule, were excluded from the analysis. These include 
compensation of employees, transfers to provinces and municipalities (equitable 
shares) as well as transfers to households (social benefits). Other transfers and 
subsidies are included in the analysis.  
The analysis conducted shows that departments tended to put through higher volumes 
of expenditure in the final month of the financial year. Sighted reasons for this tendency 
were identified as poor financial management; an attempt by departments to retain 
unspent funds and avoid those unspent budgets from being cut in the succeeding 
years; and procurement processes running late. The determination of the existence of 
a “March spike” is fixed at expenditure in March that is 16 percent of the total 
expenditure, this being about double the 8.33 percent straight line average spending 
over the twelve-month financial year. It was determined in 2005/06 that there was a 
high probability of departments settling overdue payments from preceding months 
apart from the normal March payments. An allowance was made for transactions 
whose payments tend to be lumpy rather than evenly spread out. These transactions 
include the conditional grants and compensation of employees.  
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The statistical variance of the expenditure per month for all the departments has not 
decreased over the last three years. This suggests that spending by national 
departments is slow to respond to reforms aimed at credible and prudent expenditure. 
However, the magnitude of the high and low peaks of the expenditure trend per month 
within the financial year is decreasing. Results of spending by all departments indicate 
that expenditure in March is still the highest of all the months, despite displaying a 
decreasing trend from 13.4 percent in 2012/13 to 12 percent in 2014/15.  
Even though overall the 12 percent spending in March 2014/15 reflected a level lower 
than what is viewed as a spike, disaggregating the data by department and by 
economic classification demonstrated that there is still excessive spending by certain 
departments on specific expenditure items. This was mainly on payments for capital 
assets followed by current expenditure and expenditure on households. For those 
items exhibiting a spike, comparing the April to February spending average with the 
one of January to February showed that expenditure generally started picking up 
momentum in January. In some instances, the March spending was double that of the 
January to February average. Additionally, most of the departments that had a March 
spike also had underspending for the year 2014/15. It was further noted that some 
departments had spending against items not budgeted for.  
In the national sphere, twelve out of thirty-eight departments were found to have spent 
excessively in March. The three leading departments in this spending category were 
the Department of Water Affairs, which spent 28 percent (R2.3 billion) of their total 
expenditure, Human Settlements, which spent 26.2 percent (R353.2 million) of their 
total expenditure, and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate, which spent 
24.7 percent (R22.8 million) of their total expenditure in March.  
3.15. Goods and services March spike analysis 
Goods and Services remain the largest expenditure made by national departments on 
average between 2012/13 and 2014/15 financial years. Expenditure on consultants: 
business and advisory services was one of the leading items on which departments 
spent excessively in March, with 29.9 percent (R785 million) of the total expenditure 
for this item being spent in this period. These were closely followed by contractors, 
where 24.3 percent (R1.3 billion) was spent, and agency and support/outsourced 
services, with 20.9 percent (R542.5 million) of the total expenditure spent in March.  
Twenty-six national departments were found to have spent large amounts on 
consultants: business and advisory services. The Department of International 
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Relations and Cooperation is a case in point, where 94.2 percent (R46.2 million) of 
expenditure on consultants was spent in March. The Department of Energy followed 
this department with 57.8 percent (R11.8 million) of expenditure for the item being 
spent in March, followed by the Department of Economic Development (EDD), with 53 
percent (R1.5 million) of expenditure for the item spent in March. on the item 
“contractors”, twenty national departments were identified as having spent highly in 
March. Of these, the Department of Economic Development spent 88.3 percent (R2.1 
million) of their total expenditure in March, followed by the Department of Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation, which spent 55 percent (696 000), followed by the 
Department of Basic Education, who spent 42.5 percent (R2.1 million) of their 
expenditure in March.  
Lastly, 19 national departments were identified to have spent excessively in March for 
agency and support/outsourced services, of which the Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation spent 91.6 percent (R51.7 million) of their total expenditure 
in this period, the Economic Development Department (EDD) 47 percent (98 000), 
followed by the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) with 42 
percent (764 000) spending in March. These three departments were identified as the 
top perpetrators in this regard.  
Table 3.8: Goods and services (G&S) 
 
In analysing the March spike for the goods and services item, the researcher has found 
that there are many concerns of fiscal dumping in relation to this item. On average, 
R55.3 billion was spent on goods and services between 2012/13 and 2014/15. In this 
regard, historic data shows that the spike phenomenon has slightly changed over the 
last three financial years, 2012/13 to 2014/15. In 2012/13 national departments slightly 
exceeded the 16 percent threshold by spending 16.5 percent of the budget in March, 
an indication of fiscal dumping. The situation was worse in 2013/14, where 
departments spent 17.6 percent of the total budget for the item in March. However, the 
situation improved in 2014/15, where the departments spent 14.8 percent of the goods 
and services budgets in March. Given that 16.3 percent of the expenditure on goods 
Financial Year Sum of  Total_Expenditure '000  Mar% Spent  Apr - Feb Ave % March Cut-Off %
2012/13 50 649 523 16.5% 7.6% 16.0%
2013/14 57 352 939 17.6% 7.5% 16.0%
2014/15 57 760 622 14.8% 7.7% 16.0%
Grand Total 165 763 085 16.3% 7.6% 16.0%
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and services was spent in March, it is enough evidence to conclude that there is fiscal 
dumping by departments on these items.  
Table 3.9: Households March spike analysis  
 
“Households” refer to the economic classification items that account for payments that 
are made to individuals. Old age, children’s grants and bursaries handed out to non-
employees form part of this category. This category has funds that are distributed 
through the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the South African Department of 
Small Business Development, and Arts and Culture. On average, R11 billion was spent 
on households in each of the past three years; with 19 percent of it often spent in 
March. Thirteen national departments were identified as having spent highly in March. 
Of these, the Department of Economic Development spent 53.3 percent (R8.8 million) 
of their total expenditure. There is an anomaly for the Department of Social 
Development, where 88 percent of the budget for households in 2014/15 was spent in 
March. The average spent in 2012/13 and 2013/14 financial years is 9.5 percent. The 
massive expenditure in March in 2014/15 is mainly due to the increases in social grants 
announced in the February budget speech.  
3.16. Payments for capital assets 
Payments for capital assets recorded the highest March spike. A large number of these 
payments were made for software and intangible assets, machinery and equipment, 
transport equipment, buildings and other fixed structures and other machinery and 
equipment. The department that contributed the most to the payments for the capital 
assets spike was Water Affairs, with 36.7 percent (R671.3 million). It was closely 
followed by Defence and Military Veterans, making 47.6 percent (R503.7 million) of its 
expenditure in this month. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
spent 54 percent (about R180.4 million) of their expenditure on the item during March. 
These amounts and percentages are averages over the three years (2012/13, 2013/14 
and 2014/15). Of these payments for capital assets items, machinery and equipment 
averaged a total expenditure of R4.9 billion at a national level between 2012/13 and 
2014/15 financial years. Of this budget, 26.5 percent was spent in March in 2012/13, 
Financial Year Sum of  Total_Expenditure '000  March % Spent Apr - Feb Ave % March Cut-Off %
2012/13 10 791 777 19.2% 7.3% 16.0%
2013/14 10 523 452 14.5% 7.8% 16.0%
2014/15 12 327 464 22.8% 7.0% 16.0%
Grand Total 33 642 693 19.0% 7.4% 16.0%
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40 percent in 2013/14 and 29.1 percent in 2014/15. The department that contributed 
the most to the payments for the machinery and equipment spike was Defence and 
Military Veterans, making 47.3 percent (R487.3 million) of its expenditure in this month. 
This indicates that funds are being dumped through this item.  
Table 3.10: Machinery and Equipment 
 
Although overall national department spending in the month of March is 12 percent for 
the 2014/15 financial year and therefore not seen as a March spike, the report identified 
departments (approximately 4 out of 10 departments) that spent in exceptionally high 
proportions on some items during the month of March. This indicates that although 
there is no big gap between the original budget and the actual expenditure there are 
serious concerns about how the budget is currently spent. The huge March spike 
shows that there are still some gaps in effective financial management that should be 
addressed.  
It is quite evident that the excessive expenditure in March distorts the overall 
expenditure both at an aggregate level and at a departmental level. This is because 
funds dumped in March increase the expenditure and had there been controls against 
this malicious act, the expenditure would not have taken place. On average, over the 
past three years, 2012/13 to (2014/15, national departments spent 12.8 percent of the 
total expenditure on these items. Although this is below the threshold of 16 percent, it 
is still fairly high. Furthermore, the 2013/14 spike numbers were juxtaposed against 
the spending outcomes data that measure over/underspending by departments. This 
was done to enrich the analysis of expenditure items; for example, to determine 
whether departments that have excessive spending in March also underspend on the 
same items. On a detailed level, a ratio measuring the magnitude of the spending as 
a multiple of the average spending over the period between April and February, as well 
as the spending average for the January-February periods were included.  
3.17. Excessive expenditure in March on core budget 
Core budget refers to the expenditure that a national department is directly responsible 
for spending. This expenditure excludes all the transfers and subsidies as these are 
Fininancial Year Sum of  Total_Expenditure '000  March % Spent  Apr - Feb Ave % March Cut-Off %
2012/13 5 023 810 26.5% 6.7% 16.0%
2013/14 4 784 983 40.0% 5.5% 16.0%
2014/15 4 727 661 29.1% 6.4% 16.0%
Grand Total 14 536 455 31.8% 6.2% 16.0%
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not spent by departments but by the institutions they are transferred to. The analysis 
of the core budget becomes very important, especially for the discussion on financial 
mismanagement elements in Chapter 4. The Auditor-General (AG) found that most of 
the irregular expenditure incurred by the government is because of lack of following 
supply chain management (SCM) processes (AGSA, 2012). To bring this into context, 
SCM processes do not apply to the compensation of employees and transfers and 
subsidies but only to goods and services and payments for capital assets.  
Transfers and subsidies are funds that will be spent at another institution, be it at 
another sphere, public entity or public corporation, to mention a few. Therefore, even 
though it is assumed that these funds are spent by the mere fact that they have been 
transferred, they must still be spent at the level where they are transferred to. This 
further strengthens the argument that the core budget should be the focus of the 
expenditure analysis. In addition to this, it makes sense to account for the expenditure 
where it has taken place, to avoid double counting of government expenditure. In a 
case where the research included other spheres of government or other government 
institutions such as public entities, it would have been necessary to strip out those 
transfers.  
In terms of the core budget, national departments have spent an average of 18.9 
percent (R13.2 billion) of their expenditure in March. In this category of expenditure, 
twenty-five national departments were found to have spent excessively in March. This, 
however, still discounts the compensation of employees’ expenditure for the reasons 
explained earlier in the chapter. The department that contributed the most to the core 
expenditure spike was the Department of Transport at 37.8 percent (R508.8 million). It 
was closely followed by the Department of Tourism, at 37.7 percent (R65 million) of its 
expenditure. The Department of Water and Sanitation spent 31.5 percent (R1.5 billion 
in March, the highest in rand value terms (National Treasury, 2013). 




Figure 3.2: March spike on core budget 
 
3.18. Virements analysis 
The virements process is facilitated by legislation and entails the shifting of funds within 
the departments’ programmes and items. The founding legislation for this process is 
the PFMA. It states that:  
An accounting officer for a department may utilise a saving in the amount 
appropriated under the main division within a vote towards the defrayment of excess 
expenditure under another main division within the same vote unless the relevant 
treasury directs otherwise (RSA, 1999: 42).  
The rules of virements in South Africa distinguish between a) transfers that can be 
approved by the accounting officer; b) transfers that require National Treasury’s 
approval; and c) transfers that require legislative approval. For all the different levels 
of approval, the PFMA stipulates that one of the most important conditions that need 
to be met is that the application for the shifting of funds must happen before 
expenditure is incurred, as neither the National Treasury nor Parliament may offer 
approval after the fact, the so-called Ex-post facto approval.  
The accounting officer of a department has the authority to shift funds from one 
programme to another, subject to the following limitations: funds being shifted must not 
be in excess of eight percent of the programme it is being shifted from and the funds 
must not be towards increasing compensations of employees. Furthermore, the 
accounting officer does not have authority over shifting funds from payments of capital 
assets and transfers and subsidies. Therefore, the accounting officer of a department 
has authority over shifting funds within goods and services (subject to eight percent 
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rule) and shifting funds from the compensation of employees towards other items, 
except transfers and subsidies.  
If a national department wishes to shift funds from the transfers and subsidies and 
payment for capital assets, it requires National Treasury approval. In addition to this, if 
a department has any allocations that have been earmarked by the National Treasury, 
changes in these allocations will require the Treasury’s approval. This, however, 
excludes conditional grants as these are guided by the Division of Revenue Act. These 
virements are guided by section 43 of the PFMA and section 6.3 of the Treasury 
regulations. All National Treasury approval can be done at any time during the financial 
year after the Appropriation Bill has been voted into a law by Parliament and before 
the closure of the financial year.  
Should a department wish to change the conditional grant allocation and exceed the 
eight percent shifting of funds from a programme, then approval by the legislature is 
required. The difficulty with all changes that require the approval of the legislature is 
that they can only be done once during the financial year, through the adjusted budget, 
the Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure (AENE). Failure to obtain the approval 
from the relevant authority in making adjustments to allocations results in irregular 
expenditure; even worse, it has criminal implications for the Accounting Authority.  
Table 3.11: Virement by economic classification  
 
Table 3.11 shows that during the financial year, funds are shifted mainly from transfers 
and subsidies to current payments, for the most part to compensation of employees to 
cover the shortfalls of the public service salary adjustment. This picture is mostly 
prevalent in the Department of Defence and Military Veterans, Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Rural Development and the Department of Land Reform. 
The shifting of funds towards compensation of employees is not widely accepted and 
Shah and Von Hagen (2007) note that virements between personnel expenditures and 
other economic categories need to be regulated and the regulations must be aimed at 
capping personnel expenditures (Shah & Von Hagen, 2007). For this to happen, in 
terms of Section 43 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (RSA, 1999), 
read in conjunction with Treasury Regulation 6.3.1(a), National Treasury approval is 
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necessary to apply virements of these funds and failure to obtain it results in irregular 
expenditure. In addition to this, Table 3.11 shows that there is also a trend of shifting 
funds from buildings and other fixed structures towards CoE and goods and services. 
This picture skews the composition of expenditure from capital payments to perishable 
expenditure.  
Public expenditure management reform, however, discourages this reallocation of 
funds during the financial year on the basis that it signals that either the main/original 
budget did not reflect the real priorities of government or that financial discipline does 
not exist (World Bank, 1998). These reforms make it clear that lack of stringent 
measures to prevent resource reallocation effectively compromises the credibility of 
the budget process itself. The reason for this is that the budget process is believed to 
have an inherent element of funding strategic priorities identified through a rigorous 
process of priority setting. If, however, the resources are reallocated during the 
financial year, as this is the case as seen in Table 3.4, it means that the actual 
expenditure at the end of the financial year is unlikely to reflect the strategic priorities 
of government. If government expenditure does not reflect the strategic priorities of 
government, service delivery performance will be adversely affected. South Africa has 
a high level of service delivery protests (Allan & Heese, 2009), an indication that there 
might be a level of expenditure that is not reflective of government priorities.  
The reallocation of funds during the financial year is unlikely to be informed by the 
changes in priorities, as changes in priorities are only discussed in the build-up to the 
budget allocations through the Cabinet Lekgotla processes. Also, the allocation of 
funds is appropriated and approved by Parliament. How then is it that the reallocation 
of funds during the financial year can be done without Parliament’s approval? If this is 
the case, the legitimacy of the budget process and the credibility of budget allocations 
are being undermined.  
3.19. Incentives for a credible budget 
How then should the national government incentivise good budget management? 
Incentivising good financial performance is likely to inspire departments to perform 
even better. The reward system may be linked to additional resources and or an 
exemption from budget reduction. In the 2015 budget, Cabinet made budget reductions 
of R35 billion over the MTEF (R10 billion in 2015/16, R15 billion in 2016/17 and R10 
billion in 2017/18) across all government departments. This uniform approach is 
unlikely to offer any incentives, but a system that would exempt good performing 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
departments from these budget reductions is likely to encourage all departments to 
perfume better. In addition to the exemption, another incentive measure would be to 
ensure that additional funding is allocated to government institutions that are 
implementing the budget as intended. The Expanded Public Works Programme 
(EPWP) has an incentive grant, which is allocated to those institutions that have 
exceeded the set targets. Such an incentive has proven to be effective in motivating 
institutions to perform better (RSA, 2013).  
Pauw et al. (2002) explain that the goal of financial management in government is to 
ensure that we safeguard and use available funds and other scarce resources in the 
best interest of the people. To ensure that the budget is implemented as intended, 
there need to be enforceable penalties for non-compliance. On the one hand, the 
PFMA is an Act of Parliament that regulates the management of government finances 
at both the national and provincial levels. This Act goes as far as holding individuals 
accountable for transgressions. For example, the accounting officer is held 
accountable and may be prosecuted for offences such as unauthorised expenditures 
(RSA, 1999). However, even though the state has powers to prosecute the accounting 
officers, the level of unauthorised expenditure indicates that there are no 
consequences to such offences, since there has not been a finance Act since 2005. 
There is, therefore, a need to enforce the law and persecute the wrongdoers. This 
position is echoed by Peter Allwright (2013), who conducted research on financial 
misconduct in the public service and concluded that financial misconduct was rampant 
in government and the situation was exacerbated by the absence of consistent and 
appropriate sanctioning of officials (Allwright, 2013).  
3.20. Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the budget process, and looked at the various stakeholders 
involved in the budgetary process and the applicable public expenditure management 
practices. Departments submit their estimates of expenditure for the MTEF based on 
their strategic plans and other plans. Performance indicators contained in submissions 
are aligned to those reflected in strategic and annual performance plans as informed 
by the MTSF and the NDP. The functional group, a technical committee, evaluates the 
spending plans and makes recommendations to the MTEC. The MTEC, an 
interdepartmental committee, comprising representatives from National Treasury (NT), 
Departments of Public Service and Administration, Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation, and Cooperative Governance, considers the allocation of funds in respect 
of each function in line with the outcomes approach. The MTEC makes 
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recommendations to the Ministers’ Committee on the Budget. Recommendations are 
then taken to Cabinet.  
The measures of aggregate expenditure and revenue out-turns assess the capacity of 
the Public Finance Management (PFM) systems themselves to support sound fiscal 
policy and financial management. This involves attention to the links between 
budgeting and financial management systems and other service-wide systems and 
processes of government for decision-making, for organising government, and for 
personnel management. The future path of revenue and spending for South Africa 
depends crucially on the prudent approach to the current level of public spending and 
revenue generation.  
The debt service costs to GDP ratio, revenue and expenditure are all alarming. South 
Africa therefore needs to stabilise public debt through achieving a balance between 
revenue growth, borrowing and growth in spending. It seems evident that taxes are 
already too high and economists hold the view that increasing taxes decreases 
consumption spending, which consequently decreases economic activity and 
economic growth. It appears as though the only plausible option of ensuring fiscal 
sustainability is by cutting expenditure. For that reason, current policy proposals of the 
NHI, nuclear power and post-education programmes are simply not affordable. 
Aggregate expenditure and revenue out-turns affirm that the projected expenditure is 
often not far from the actual expenditure. This therefore means that the estimates of 
budget and expenditure are reliable and accurate. However, there are elements to the 
credibility of the budget, namely its expenditure. This element is problematic at an 
individual departmental level as well as in terms of economic classification items. As a 
result, the budget of each of the departments is often not aligned with expenditure.  
Other elements that result in the questioning of the prudent expenditure management 
are virements and March spikes. Virements are legitimate processes of shifting funds 
from one programme or economic classification item to the next. This section is 
legislated by section 43 of the PFMA and section 6.3.1 of the Treasury regulation. 
However, the analysis of the virements shows that implementation of this provision 
perpetuates the wage bill concerns and involves shifting funds from priority areas that 
have been identified and funded through a rigorous budget process. There is a lot of 
expenditure by departments that takes place in March which is an indication of lack of 
zeal to return funds to the revenue fund. The zeal is due to the implications of monies 
returned to the NRF as this is used as the basis for budget reductions in the next 
budget process. Therefore, the very instrument (budget reductions) meant to guide 
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against waste appears to be counterproductive and perpetuates bad expenditure 
practices. The analysis of the March spike shows that the spending in March 
constitutes fiscal dumping, and while there are currently no systems for regulating this, 
there is a need to address it as its implications are damaging to the credibility of 
government’s budgeting and spending practices. Some consideration is needed to 
hold departments accountable for this practice. This can be done through the issuing 
of a practice note by the National Treasury. Such controls can incentivise departments 
to have credible budgets, especially when the budget process rewards credible 
budgets and punishes malicious practices.  
The next chapter concentrates on the performance of South African national 
departments in practice on the budgetary outcomes of aggregate allocative efficiencies 
and operational efficiencies, the two components of value for money.  
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CHAPTER 4 : ALLOCATIVE AND OPERATIONAL  EFFICIENCY  
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the “value for money” concepts, paying particular attention to 
the technical and operational efficiencies. As defined elsewhere in this document, 
“allocative efficiency” refers to the allocation of scarce resources to the most cost-
effective programmes, projects and activities in well-considered areas. Under this 
subheading, the researcher will begin by looking at the resource allocation prioritisation 
process, and proceed to examine the three specific indicators – the Gini-coefficient for 
income distribution; the Fragile State Index; and the Human Development Index (HDI) 
– a measure a measure of development using a combination of life expectancy at birth 
(longevity), knowledge, and GDP per capita. Furthermore, the researcher will analyse 
the composition of government expenditure.  
Technical or operational efficiency is concerned with whether funds have been used 
efficiently in the areas where they have been allocated. In this chapter, the researcher 
will focus on financial misconduct and mismanagement of government funds; and the 
values of unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditures. In addition, the 
researcher will analyse the payment of invoices within the government.  
4.2. Value for money 
Experts in the field of budgeting and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) argue that 
thinking in terms of costs has become more prominent among public servants (Rieder 
& Lehmann, 2002). This is said to be a catalyst to improve the flexibility and efficiency 
of programme managers (Scott, 2001), since they are able to allocate resources that 
respond to current needs rather than rely on historical expectations that are 
represented in the estimates (Boyle, 1991). According to the PFMA, the responsibilities 
of the accounting officer are to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and transparency. In 
short, they need to ensure that there is value for the money being spent. The 
accounting officer needs to comply with the above in order to enhance financial 
management and internal control (section 38).  
The increasing public demands for greater government accountability, transparency, 
effectiveness and mounting pressures on public expenditure supported by calls for 
value for money have resulted in governments around the world seeking justification 
for continued government expenditure. These challenges have led to calls for 
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governments around the world to show value for money. The pressure to be ‘doing 
more with less’ has become stronger as public sector spending comes under intense 
scrutiny and is expected to decline sharply in real terms over the next few years. In this 
context, more effective leadership across the total public service system is increasingly 
seen as one of the most powerful ways of reducing transaction costs between stand-
alone organisations, and of improving efficiency, performance and productivity through 
collaboration across the entire public sector (Benington & Moore, 2010: 12).  
In South Africa, the PFMA implementation plans include performance management 
and confer on departments the responsibility to spend within approved budgets, and 
against policy and performance commitments. However, even though the departments 
have the responsibility to spend government funds to advance their mandates, the 
PFMA requires departments to develop measurable objectives by the programme. All 
these elements are necessary for the government to attain value for money (VFM). 
VFM is arguably the hardest thing to achieve through the budget. This is mainly 
because the PFMA mandates the National Treasury (NT) to ensure VFM, while the NT 
has no direct say in how a department spends its money or how services are delivered, 
and cannot impose sanctions for poor spending. If departments are to report on 
performance alongside spending, then Parliament, the public, and the media can play 
a role in improving the quality of spending. It is all about accountability, which is not a 
financial management issue but a political issue. The VFM agenda is an area where 
progress has been made; it is the area where the Treasury spends most of its 
resources and the area of major focus in the budget reform agenda.  
VFM promotes allocative, and operational efficiencies and effectiveness through 
guaranteeing that the budget allocation decisions are continuously reviewed to ensure 
their relevance and need to respond to social needs (Robinson & Brumby 2005: 12). 
While that is true, one of the key plausible ideas of VFM is its customer orientation; 
putting users at the heart of services. This way of thinking about service delivery is 
introduced in the new public management paradigm and promotes the ideals of VFM 
spent. However, VFM needs to be embedded in an organisational culture, as it cannot 
promote allocative and operational efficiencies without an organisational culture of 
management that is supportive of this reform and having internalised it as a 
management function through managing for results techniques (OECD, 2007: 129). 
This is more so since citizens are putting governments under increasing pressure to 
show that they are providing VFM.  
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VFM begins with the questioning of the assumption that citizens understand what 
service delivery is planned to take place against the allocated funding. Enhancing 
citizens’ rights to access information and participation in policy platforms is key and a 
constitutional right. Post-1994, the National Treasury consults through formal 
structures with major civil society organisations and other institutions, e.g. at the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC). Public consultations 
also exist through the following platforms:  
 Policy and budget roadshows;  
 Social media; and  
 Local government engagements on development of plans, e.g. Integrated 
Development Plans, and Growth and Development Strategies. 
Numerous policies and laws that promote public involvement and the right to access 
information exist in respect of all three pillars of the state, i.e. executive, judiciary and 
the legislature. Putting citizen participation at the heart of service delivery begins to 
emphasise the importance of what the public values.  
Public Value (PV) is not what the public wants but what encompasses the whole; it is 
not about sectional interest but a bottom-up policy process. However, some see public 
participation as a part of an information gathering exercise designed to improve the 
quality of service delivery rather than as a means of creating more deliberative forms 
of government or alternative approaches to decision-making (Orr & McAteer, 2006). 
Public Value places responsibility in the hands of elected political heads and their 
officials, rather than calling for the creation of yet more new institutions or adding extra 
layers to already complex accountability frameworks within which public service 
delivery is nested, as political principles become more distant from decision-making 
and the point of delivery (Gains & Stoker, 2008). Public Value argues that public 
services are unique because they are characterised by entitlements by citizens to 
services that have been provided for through a legitimate budget process (Coats & 
Passmore, 2008). The notion of Public Value, therefore, complements the ideals of 
NPM on emphasising the utilisation of private sector principles and business conduct, 
specifically those of large production organisations. Both these ideals emphasise that 
government needs to continuously re-position itself in the complex, dynamic, changing 
environments that are becoming ever more unpredictable (Benington & Moore, 2010: 
9).  
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In addition, Benington and Moore (2010) state that PV did not originate with any fixed 
idea about the substantive content of government’s responsibilities. It accepted the 
claim that government needed to improve its operations, and that this could include 
not only changing the size and scope of government as described above, but could 
also involve contextualising the model to one in which government could pay for things 
to be produced, but not necessarily produce them itself (Benington & Moore, 2010: 9). 
Therefore, the concept of PV refers to co-production; collaborating with the public as a 
means of service improvement. The United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office has defined co-
production as, 
a more active role for the citizen and communities either in directly delivering a 
public service or in changing their behaviour in ways that contribute to the ultimate 
outcomes, ultimately, the service exists to deliver e.g. changes in diet and fitness 
activity that lead to better health (Cabinet Office, 2006).  
PV links to VFM, as both concepts refer to how much improvement, by what means, 
and how it could attain the result more effectively (Shadish, Cook & Leviton, 1991: 19). 
Thinking about VFM from the perspective of PV is very different from conventional 
approaches to measurement and performance management, drawing inspiration from 
Moore’s observation that the efforts of public sector managers should not be 
approached from the perspective of the economic marketplace of individual 
consumers, but in the political marketplace of citizens. This refers not only to 
citizenship consultation for the purposes of compliance but consultation for improving 
the quality of service delivery (Moore, 1995).  
Successes in public participation have been denoted by current initiatives such as the 
budget outreach programme to universities. However, stronger ties with Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) through the CSO budget coalition are still needed. Challenges 
in attaining this still remain, for instance how to address the logistical concerns with 
demands for step-by-step involvement in budgeting. This is a challenge, given the 
extensive engagement that is needed and the limited time in the budget process. Other 
challenges include:  
   
 Concerns with maintaining budget process confidentiality;  
 Concern about allegations of institutional “capture” by certain CSOs; 
 Concerns about misunderstanding of Treasury’s powers in government;  
 Concerns about CSO commitment to genuine citizen empowerment;  
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 Concerns about lack of analytical rigour in CSO work; and   
 Concerns about lack of cohesion in the CSO sector. 
Current initiatives and programmes aimed at public participation have unfortunately 
been aimed at information gathering rather than finding local solutions to local 
problems. PV is about creating networks that add value to the communities. However, 
the researcher believes that there needs to be a move away from thinking that 
networks are places of equality because networks do not promote equality, and neither 
are they meant to address that issue. The idea is that each community should identify 
what means most to it and organise itself and consult with other stakeholders 
(government and other stakeholders) to achieve that goal. One neighbourhood might 
need a library while the another might need an old age home; not all neighbourhoods 
will create the same networks. These networks could potentially widen the inequalities 
in society. Therefore, government must look at strategies and plans to address the 
shortfalls, paying particular attention to the neighbourhoods not deemed stable.  
From this analysis, the importance of the relationship between VFM and PV is evident, 
with the former being arguably hindered by the system of accounting being used. 
Various authors argue that accrual accounting is best suited for a government that 
seeks to achieve VFM.  
Accrual budgeting is an analytic tool that provides information and insights that are not 
available through the conventional approach of cash budgeting. The South African 
system utilises cash-based budgeting (for national government and provinces). 
Accrual accounting is often seen to support effective financial management and 
facilitate the further development of output and performance measures. The difference 
between the two is massive, as the cash budgeting approach means that transactions 
are realised as they take place, while the accrual budgeting system implies that the full 
value of costs and transactions is used. Modified Cash Accounting (MCA) entails the 
recording of expenditures and incomes, and therefore provides information on how 
much cash was spent and received. For example, when purchasing an asset like a 
motor vehicle, the cost of the car paid in cash in year one will be the total cost of the 
vehicle and for a life span of five years, no further passive costs will be incurred over 
that car. However, on an accrual basis, the value of that car is adjusted on a year-to-
year basis and its passive costs like depreciation are taken into account as cost items 
and increase the operational costs of the institution.  
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From a more conservative approach, one would understand why the most accurate 
and viable option would be the accrual accounting system of budgeting. The South 
African accounting system of budgeting can be criticised for its inconsistency, given 
that some organs of the state, local government (municipalities), public entities (like 
the museums) and state-owned institutions like Eskom are using the accrual 
accounting system while the more central government in national and provincial 
departments is using a modified cash basis. This inconsistency results in the failure to 
fully consolidate government’s expenditure. International best practices have pointed 
towards the accrual-based budgeting as it captures the full costs of doing transactions.  
Typical consequences are either enormous spending at the end of a financial year, 
what is referred to as the March spike in Chapter 3, or the holding back of payments 
at the end of the financial year to prevent exceeding allocations. While there is no 
legislation against this, the researcher notes that it is bad budgeting and expenditure 
practice as the enormous expenditure at the end of the financial year may not 
necessarily mean spending on priorities, but rather on activities that can be executed 
in time. This excessive expenditure in March is discussed in Chapter 3, where the 
researcher deduced that it hinders allocative efficiency. In addition, MCA does not 
sufficiently distinguish between amounts spent on operating expenditure (perishable 
goods and services) and amounts spent in capital expenditure, what is often referred 
to as investment expenditure as they are both (operational and capital expenditures) 
written off in the year in which spending takes place.  
There is therefore a need to migrate to accrual accounting for the national government 
to attain VFM. This view is supported by a number of writers in this field, including 
Barrett, who believes that accrual accounting promotes transparency with respect to 
costs as public sector managers can be better informed of the cost-effectiveness and 
value for money of their programmes (Barrett, 2004). In addition, Barrett observed the 
emergence of a culture more focused on performance and accountability after accrual 
accounting came into effect.  
4.3. Allocative efficiency 
The MTSF has played a pivotal role in the emergence of budgeting by priority. This 
framework can be located within the Government-Wide Monitoring and Evaluation 
System, with a specific focus on setting up priority programmes for government. The 
MTSF was first introduced in 2010 as a platform to set out outcomes and programmes 
that the then new administration would focus on in their term of office. DPME leads this 
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process and obtains various inputs from the Treasury (on the financial side) and 
various line departments (on their mandates). The key processes involved in MTSF 
encompass, but are not limited to, the president signing performance agreements with 
all ministers, each line department signing delivery agreements with DPME. There are 
also implementation forums and quarterly progress reporting.  
Performance agreements with all Ministers 
The president and his cabinet ministers agree on a management tool to hold 
themselves accountable to the public by signing performance agreements that would 
outline what the ministers need to achieve, how they will be evaluated, and the 
frequency of that assessment. In the past, ministers were not accountable for failures 
of their departments since they did not have individual performance agreements, but 
could have been held accountable for the failures of their departments. However, 
according to the PFMA, it is the executive authority (DG) of the department that is 
accountable for financial management of the department’s finances. That being the 
case, it then means that the ministers cannot be held accountable for something that 
the DGs are held accountable for by law. It must be noted that there is no legal 
framework for performance agreements between members of the executive; therefore, 
there are no hard and fast rules on how this should be handled or whether it should be 
legislated or not. It remains just a management tool.  
4.4. Delivery agreements 
Line departments have  five-year results-based plans that cut across departments and 
spheres of government. These agreements are in the form of outcomes (12 outcomes 
in 2010 and 14 outcomes in 2014). They describe outputs, sub-outputs, measurable 
indicators, targets and key activities. They identify required inputs and clarify roles and 
responsibilities. These delivery agreements/ outcomes form the basis of the content of 
the Strategic Performance Plans (SPPs) and Annual Performance Plans (APPs), 
although the content of the SPPs and APPs is expected to be more detailed. It can be 
added that the outcomes themselves are informed by the work of the National Planning 
Commission and the National Development Plan.  
The Cabinet needs to sign off on the MTSF and departments are also required by law 
to table their SPPs and APPs to cabinet. Therefore, the link to the delivery agreements 
and these planning documents is non-negotiable and all three documents need to link 
with government’s policy document, the National Development Plan. Once the sign-off 
has taken place, DPME is required to conduct periodic reviews and revision of 
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Agreements, where necessary. It is DPME that captures progress against Delivery 
Agreements on Programme of Action (POA) and creates a reporting template which is 
submitted to cabinet for approval. This cabinet-approved reporting template has a 
layout which includes: a strategic overview of the impact on society; challenges and 
blockages affecting delivery and actions to address these and cross-cutting issues. 
This template can also be used to inform the executive by focusing on key areas of 
progress and challenges requiring unblocking. The periodic review, which consists of 
briefing notes for the legislature, uses the reporting template as an annexure to the 
notes, providing an independent assessment of progress, challenges and 
recommendations for quarterly performance attached to it.  
Each year, the accounting officer of an institution must prepare and produce a SPP 
and an APP with a five-year planning horizon that is always linked to the new 
administration’s term of office. These documents determine the planned projects and 
associated resource implications. SPP should ideally not be changed over the five-
year period unless there are significant policy changes relating to the mandate or the 
service delivery environment, in which case the SPPs need to be tabled to Parliament 
with changes attached as an annexure (National Treasury, 2009:15). The link between 
SPP, APP, budgeting and spending plans is vital in compiling a credible budget, as 
inadequate planning is likely not to be linked with strategic objectives (National 
Treasury, 2008: 4). For this reason, the MTSF defines the essence of SPPs and APPs 
within the context of other broader plans, policies, projects and programmes, including 
long-term infrastructure and development proposals. The MTSF therefore provides the 
platform for strategic and performance plans with regard to legislation, policies, 
programmes and budgets.  
These plans with their projected costs are then taken to the Function group technical 
committee through a process called the MTEF. The National Treasury issues 
guidelines to government institutions that give guidance on the principles that inform 
the preparation of the MTEF. The MTEF budget process is intended to inform the 
overall resource envelope, with the estimate of the current departmental plans and the 
costing of new proposed priorities and expenditure programmes (National Treasury, 
2007: 3). The National Treasury, through the MTEF process, is expected to make 
informed decisions about allocations, a process that requires an analysis of 
performance to help build a firm basis for allocations. Therefore, funds are ultimately 
allocated to the priorities of government that are seen as strategic and linked to the 
required growth path. Their budget has been determined through robust and open 
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dialogue with the National Treasury. A detailed discussion on the MTEF is done in 
Chapter 5.  
However, despite the legislated rigorous process of priority setting and resource 
allocation, South Africa is characterised by high levels of poverty and high income 
inequality between population (race) groups and within groups. Leibbrandt, Woolard, 
Finn and Argent (2010) find that the Gini coefficient, the most often used indicator of 
income inequality, increased from 0.66 in 1993 to 0.70 in 2008, even though a more 
recent publication by Statistics South Africa shows that this coefficient is now at 0.65 
(Stats SA, 2013). Furthermore, a popular measure of human development is the HDI, 
which captures life expectancy at birth (longevity), knowledge and GDP per capita. 
GDP refers to all products produced within the country at a given time (Roux, 2013: 
22). An HDI value in excess of 0.9 (1.0 is the maximum) denotes very high human 
development; a value between 0.8 and 0.9 denotes high human development; a value 
between 0.5 and 0.8 shows medium human development; and a value below 0.5 
indicates low human development. Using this indicator therefore shows that in 1990, 
the HDI for South Africa was 0.621, but in 2012, it was 0.629 (Stats SA, 2013).  
Using both indicators, one can therefore deduce that even though government’s 
expenditure grew substantially between 1990 and 2014, it was not able to improve the 
human development and income inequality of the people; over the years, the poor have 
become poorer, while the rich have become extremely rich. Lack of improvement in 
human development could indicate that government has not been spending on the 
most productive expenditure categories, which might mean that government 
allocations have not been efficient. It is important though to note that there are factors 
that go beyond funding in measuring HDI, these include life expectancy at birth, Gross 
National Income amongst others.. However, since one of the government’s top 
priorities is to bridge the income gap and advance human development, allocations 
have not been efficient to realise this. As a measure of the income gap referred to here, 
the Gini coefficient is relatively high at 0.65 (based on expenditure data) and 0.69 
(based on income data). These figures are amongst the highest in the world and reflect 
high levels of inequality (Stats SA, 2013). South Africa has also not been successful in 
advancing human development, as 46 percent of the population live below the R620 
per month (US$2/day) poverty line and 5.5 million of the population that are actively 
looking for jobs are unemployed, resulting in a 25.5 percent unemployment rate. This 
unemployment rate could be higher if the 2.4 million discouraged people were included 
(Stats SA, 2013).  
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4.5. Composition of government expenditure 
The National Treasury has reiterated plans to maintain the spending ceilings contained 
in the 2015 Budget. This it reports is in line with South Africa’s ambition of faster 
growth, reducing unemployment, poverty and inequality alleviation. Moreover, shifting 
the composition of expenditure more towards investment spending away from 
consumption spending is seen as a key to this strategy (National Treasury, 2015a). 
Elsewhere, in Chapter 2, the researcher discusses findings by various authors such as 
Ngandu et al. (2010), Fedderke and Garlick (2008), Gupta, Clements, Baldacci and 
Mulas-Granados (2005) and Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), who all show that capital or 
infrastructure spending results in the accumulation of the public capital stock, whereas 
current public spending is spending on perishable goods. Therefore, South Africa 
needs to strike an appropriate balance between capital and current spending.  
Table 4.1: National government composition of expenditure 
 
Table 4.1 shows that the composition of national government expenditure is skewed 
towards current expenditure, with compensation of employees approximately 22 
percent of government expenditure. This is a case peculiar to South Africa, where 
government is the biggest employer in the economy. The high spending on 
compensation limits spending that could be channelled towards investment 
programmes that would boost the economy. There is therefore a need for government 
to moderate growth in employee compensation while fast-tracking infrastructure 
delivery.  
In addition to the high spending on Compensation of Employees, there are also 
concerns about the spending in financing debt, which is another expenditure item that 
derails the state from spending on capital assets. A sharp increase in financing 
Economic Classification 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Current payments 239 793 714     268 928 363    290 392 879     
Compensation of employees 102 577 967     111 554 930    119 532 693     
Goods and services 49 001 992        56 131 348      55 740 907       
Interest and rent on land 88 213 755        101 242 085    115 119 279     
Payments for capital assets 13 340 609        13 569 985      14 676 423       
Payments for financial assets 3 568 684          3 898 240        3 805 979          
T ransfers and subsidies 216 864 833     227 468 180    242 588 866     
Compensation of employees as % of total budget 22% 22% 22%
Payments for capital assets as % of total budget 3% 3% 3%
Grand Total 473 567 840     513 864 768    551 464 147     
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requirements means interest is now the fastest growing area of spending over the 
MTEF (see Table 3.5). This eventually leads to a decline in government resources as 
rising interest costs crowd out more productive expenditure. There is, therefore, limited 
space for allocative efficiency if the government continues to spend 10 percent of the 
total expenditure on debt service costs (interest on debt). There is a need to increase 
the fiscal space created by lowering debt ratio and ensuring that much of the state 
expenditure is channelled to critical government programmes that have a long-term 
positive impact on the lives of ordinary South Africans. The current trajectory of debt-
service cost is crippling the efficiency at which government services are delivered.  
 
Figure 4.1: The growth of service costs before and after the 2008/09 recession 
Source: National Treasury Budget Review, 2012. 
4.6. Addressing allocative inefficiencies during the mid-term budget 
Another attempt to ensure allocative efficiency is undertaken in the mid-term budget. 
The mid-term budget as regulated by section 30, of the PFMA presents another 
opportunity for the South African government to make in-year adjustments to the 
allocations. These in-year adjustments have been used for mainly two purposes: 
building fiscal space and reallocating resources from one institution or project to the 
next. Furthermore, when reference is made to budget reductions in the in-year 
adjustments, the term declared savings is often used and while departments are often 
given an opportunity to initiate this process of declaring savings, the Treasury often 
has to declare these savings on behalf of the departments using the provisions of 
section 30 of the PFMA. This, therefore, means that the concept of declared savings 
does not necessarily mean the relevant departments have to agree; in essence, it 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
relates to what the PFMA alludes to when it refers to the decrease in the departmental 
allocations in a year. In addition to this, even though the Treasury may have declared 
savings on behalf of the department, the relevant departments may still decide to make 
savings from areas other than those identified by the Treasury but will still have to meet 
the amount of savings declared.  
This means that information on how the reductions will impact on the achievement of 
outputs must also be provided. Reductions should ideally not be taken away from 
transfers to households, non-profit institutions, universities and municipalities and from 
conditional grants, except where the evidence points to incapacity to spend effectively. 
Amounts budgeted for conditional grants should not be reduced to other spending 
items, except when there is underspending, for which evidence must be provided. 
Institutions should also provide information on measures taken to address causes for 
underspending or underperformance.  
An administrative process has for the first time been implemented in the 2015 mid-
term budget that makes a provision for the reversal of funds that were not spent at the 
provincial department level back to the national revenue fund. Section 22 (1) of the 
Division of Revenue Act of 2014 states that “Despite anything to the contrary in the 
Public Finance Management Act or the Municipal Finance Management Act, any 
conditional allocation, or a portion thereof, that is not spent at the end of the 2015/2016 
financial year reverts back to the National Revenue Fund, unless the roll-over of the 
allocation is approved in terms of subsection” (2). 
4.7. Operational efficiency 
Improving efficiency in government by minimising waste in spending without sacrificing 
service delivery should be of key importance to any government. There are various 
ways in which government aims to achieve operational efficiency and these are 
legislated through various statutes but mainly through the PFMA, the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) 
and various labour legislations. Supplementary subordinate regulations that have the 
force of law include the Treasury Regulations (TRs) and various Treasury instruction 
notes. These legislative requirements enforce accountability on both the part of 
government and individuals employed in government.  
The Auditor-General’s (AG’s) audit functions performed in terms of the Public Audit 
Act, 2004 (Act no. 25 of 2004) give opinion on how these various legislations have 
been applied in government institutions. When the AG conducts its audit at the end of 
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the financial year, the focus is often on three areas: Annual Financial Statements 
(AFS), Predetermined Objectives, and Compliance to Laws and Regulations. All these 
aspects are of key importance to operational efficiency of the budgets. While all three 
aspects are guided primarily by the PFMA, each of these aspects has a specific 
subordinate framework, which has the force of law. For the AFS, the Modified Cash 
Standard (MCS) is such a framework. The pros and cons of this framework are 
discussed and compared to the accrual accounting standard in Chapter 5.  
The last aspect, Compliance to Laws and Regulations, is guided by the TR. While there 
is a view that the public finances are overregulated, there is insufficient evidence to 
show that appropriate steps are being taken against those who break these regulations 
and legislations. Lack of enforcement of rules is evident from the waste in government 
spending. There are three main categories of financial mismanagement in government 
that mainly result from non-compliance with the law. These are unauthorised, irregular 
and fruitless and wasteful expenditures.  
Table 4.2: Financial transgressions over time 
 
The PFMA defines unauthorised expenditure as any expenditure not in accordance 
with the mandate of the department, or not in accordance with the purpose of the 
programme, or the overspending of a department or a programme within a department 
(RSA, 1999: 12). Unauthorised expenditure involves breaking the law. It may require 
criminal proceedings and the accounting officer may be goaled. Between 2011/12 and 
2013/14 financial years, national government departments incurred unauthorised 
expenditure amounting to R151.6 million. Table 3.11 shows that the value of irregular 
expenditure incurred over the past three financial years amounts to R8.1 billion. 
Irregular expenditure is any other financial mismanagement transgression, other than 
unauthorised expenditure, incurred in contravention of or that is not in accordance with 
a requirement of any applicable legislation, be it legislation, the State Tender Board 
Act of 1968 (Act No. 86 of 1968), or any regulations made in terms of that Act (RSA, 
1999: 8). This form of transgression increased from R1.7 billion in 2011/12 to R4.1 
billion in 2013/14. This is an issue of major concern, since it is getting worse with time. 
According to the AG:  
Transgression in 000' 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14
Unauthorised expenditure 27 026 124 601 0
Irregular  expenditure 1 795 490 2 167 694 4 133 530
Fruitless and wasteful expenditure 98 873 98 673 324 190
Total 1 921 389 2 390 968 4 457 720
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Irregular expenditure continues to be of particular concern. This is the expenditure 
that was not made in the manner prescribed by legislation. Such expenditure does 
not necessarily mean that money was wasted or that fraud was committed, but is 
an indicator that legislation is not being adhered to, including legislation aimed at 
ensuring that procurement processes are competitive and fair. It is also an 
indicator of a significant breakdown in controls at some auditees (AGSA, 2012: 2).  
Irregular expenditure compromises the credibility of government’s finances and the 
processes thereof. This transgression can be condoned by either the accounting officer 
of the department, the NT or by Parliament, depending on the severity of the 
transgression. However, the accounting officer has the responsibility of taking 
appropriate actions, including instituting disciplinary proceedings against the official 
who has done wrong. The accounting officer must then ensure that this irregular 
expenditure is immediately reported to the National Treasury as required by section 40 
(4) (b) of the PFMA. In addition, the Treasury Regulations (RSA, 2005: 25) state that 
“Irregular expenditure incurred by a department in contravention of tender procedures 
must also be brought to the notice of the relevant tender board or procurement 
authority, whichever applicable.”  
The third element of financial misconduct relates to fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 
Between 2011/12 and 2013/14 financial years, national government departments 
incurred fruitless and wasteful expenditure amounting to R521.7 million. This 
expenditure relates to expenditure that was made in vain and would have been avoided 
had reasonable care been exercised (RSA, 1999: 7). This form of transgression 
increased from R98.8 million in 2011/12 to R324 .2 million in 2013/14.  
4.8. Global competitiveness 
On an annual basis, the World Economic Forum formulates a tool that measures the 
institutions, policies and factors that affect the microeconomic and macroeconomic 
foundations of a nation’s competitiveness. This tool consists of 110 variables, a 
combination that makes up the indicator referred to as the Global Competitiveness 
Index (GCI) (Schwab, 2015). Following four years of decline in the Global 
Competitiveness Report, South Africa’s competitiveness ranking is 56 of the 144 
countries being measured. This decline is mainly due to the reported mistrust of 
government. Amongst the indicators in this category are the trust in politicians, where 
South Africa was ranked 98th; the perceived favouritisms in decisions of government 
officials, 105th; and the wastefulness of government expenditure, where South Africa 
is ranked 91st. The poor performance of the South African economy on these indicators 
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is not surprising when one looks at the financial management transgressions. It is 
important to note that this global competitiveness is an Executive Opinion Survey and 
represents the views of business Executives across the globe. It is therefore not a 
scientific measure of South Africa’s global competitiveness.   
Peter Allwright (2013), a Director in Horizon Forensics, conducted research on 
financial misconduct in the public service and found that financial misconduct is 
rampant in government; the situation is exacerbated by the absence of consistent and 
appropriate sanctioning of officials. To make his point on the latter, his forensic 
investigation shows that of the 88 percent of officials found guilty of financial 
misconduct, only 19 percent were dismissed, while the common sanction was a final 
written warning (Allwright, 2013).  
With regard to the former, the Public Service Commission (PSC) report presented to 
Parliament in November 2015 states that the recovery process was sluggish and did 
not always take place. This report further shows that huge amounts of government 
funds have not been recovered (Public Service Commission, 2015). These findings 
further support the 2013 forensic investigation conducted by Peter Allwright (2013), 
which stated that only 13 percent of the losses were recovered from the officials who 
had transgressed (Allwright, 2013). The Auditor-General reported that the 2014/15 
audited financial standards showed inadequate consequences for poor performance 
and transgressions (AGSA, 2012).  
lack of consequences for poor performance and transgressions were a cause of poor 
audit outcomes at 42 percent of the 309 auditees that did not obtain clean audit 
opinions (47% of the departments and 39% of the public entities). Irregular as well as 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure clearly shows a lack of consequences for 
transgressions (AGSA, 2012: 104). The analysis above indicates that government 
spending has many inefficiencies embedded in its systems. Stronger sanctions and 
controls are needed to ensure that financial mismanagement of funds is kept at minimal 
levels. To correct this, the South African government wants to increase the efficiency 
of its spending programmes by eradicating fraud and corruption. As part of 
government’s commitment to deal with issues of fraud and corruption, the NT has set 
up the office of the chief procurement officer, which is headed by a DDG within the 
National Treasury and is also reviewing the country’s supply chain management 
legislation. This is aimed at securing competitive and cost-efficient public procurement 
(National Treasury, 2015a). The aim is also to ensure that government gets value for 
money.  
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4.9. Summary and conclusion 
In a nutshell, the public expenditure management principles in South Africa have been 
linked to broader efforts to improve expenditure control and public accountability as set 
out in the PFMA and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA). It can be argued 
that public expenditure management can be used as a tool to promote efficiency and 
effectiveness of public services, as it advocates for increased flexibility for managers 
to deliver these services economically. Financial management controls have further 
enhanced the advocacy of the use of systems to ensure value for money. However, 
there is a need to strengthen financial management systems and accounting standards 
in order to strengthen government’s ability to allocate funds efficiently and spend them 
effectively. This can be done by improving the link between budgeting, policy making 
and planning. This emphasises the focus on performance, both from a financial side 
and non-financial side, to attain value for money.  
Although allocative and operational efficiency in the allocation of public expenditure 
are the core objectives of performance budgeting, there is also an important link 
between performance budgeting and macro-level goals pertaining to the level of 
aggregate expenditure and to fiscal sustainability. Evidently, to the extent that 
performance budgeting succeeds in boosting operational efficiency, aggregate public 
expenditure should, everything else remaining the same, be smaller than it would be 
otherwise. Expressed differently, there is a productivity dividend, which can be used 
either to keep the tax burden down or to fund new service priorities. It is worth noting 
that allocative efficiency helps rationalise budget allocations by using strategic 
priorities and outcomes as a basis of evidence for making tough choices in resource 
allocations.  
Increasing public debt, coupled with the composition of government expenditure that 
is skewed towards compensation of employees, and the high financial 
mismanagement of funds indicate that the South African government has been unable 
to attain the budgetary outcomes of aggregate fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency 
and operational efficiency. The next chapter analyses mechanisms needed to impose 
sanctions for violating budgetary rules.  
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CHAPTER 5 : ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY  
5.1. Introduction 
The analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 highlight how the South African 
government is borrowing money to pay for current spending, This spending pattern is 
discouraged in this research study. The study further proposes that there is inefficiency 
in budget allocations and spending. This chapter asks questions about measures in 
place to counter identified shortfalls and whether the government is accounting 
properly to the people for its failures to adhere to outlined plans.  
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) suggest that if results are not measured, it would be 
difficult to distinguish success from failure. Thus, if success is not visible, it cannot be 
rewarded, and if success is not rewarded, failure is most likely to be rewarded. Osborne 
and Gaebler (1992) further observe that if success is not seen, one cannot learn from 
it. In the same breath, if one cannot recognise failure, one cannot correct it. Within this 
context, if one can demonstrate results, one can win public support (Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992). Against this backdrop, it is important that the government should win 
public support and that it is able to account for the money spent and can show what 
the money is used for. This speaks to both accountability and transparency.  
The principles of accountability and transparency are introduced in the South African 
Constitution, Section 195(1), and Local Government Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 
2000. This legislation states that a performance management system must be 
developed to promote effectiveness and accountability in public administration and 
provide better information and efficient use of state resources. The Constitution further 
states that national, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary processes must 
promote transparency, accountability and effective financial management of the 
economy, debt and the public sector (section 215(1)). In addition, many other 
government policies and legislative frameworks also place emphasis on accountability 
and transparency and these include the White Paper on Transforming the Public 
Service (RSA, 1997) and the Public Finance Management Act, 1999. Furthermore, the 
objectives of the PFMA are rooted in promoting transparency, accountability, and 
sound management of the revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities.  
The increasing public demands for greater government accountability, transparency, 
and effectiveness, and mounting pressures on public expenditure, supported by calls 
for value for money, have resulted in governments around the world seeking 
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justification for continued government expenditure. Reforms introduced to attain public 
support have introduced the trajectory of public expenditure management. As 
highlighted in Chapter 4 and elsewhere in this research, public expenditure 
management aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure by 
linking resource allocation to outputs through making systematic use of performance 
information and financial models. Public expenditure management uses systematic 
performance information (performance indicators, programme evaluations and 
programme costing) to link budgets to performance information. Literature and 
research around public expenditure management propose that the impact of public 
expenditure management may be felt in the improved prioritisation of expenditure, and 
in improved service effectiveness and/or efficiency. So in this chapter, the researcher 
found that while the values of accountability and transparency are embedded in the 
Constitution, the PFMA and the White Paper on Public Administration on Batho Pele 
Principles and other government legislation, public servants and politicians are seldom 
held responsible for the exercise of the authority provided to them. This lack of 
accountability is consistent with the finding made in chapter 3 and four that show 
deteriorating aggregate fiscal discipline, the high values of unauthorised, irregular and 
fruitless and wasteful expenditures is as a result of lack of internal controls to hold 
officials accountable for their decision.  
5.2. Accountability 
Public expenditure management as a management system requires government 
institutions to set up financial management systems, models, clear goals and provide 
detailed information on the functionality of these systems. In modern reforms, public 
expenditure management is a modern management tool and not a solution to all 
budgeting problems; it is seen as a refined reform for public sector efficiency and 
performance culture that seeks to improve transparency and accountability. 
Transparency and accountability are critical in imposing implicit costs and when 
relevant, explicit sanctions on politicians and bureaucrats for violating budgetary rules. 
Accountability means that politicians and public officials have to respond periodically 
to questions concerning their activities and must be held responsible for the exercise 
of the authority provided to them (Djurović-Todorović & Djordjević, 2009). In this 
regard, being held responsible should lead to consequences where there is evidence 
of misuse of public funds. In addition, corruption, which is the misuse of public or 
private office for direct or indirect personal gain, poses moral and legal problems and 
is a major source of inefficiency in public expenditure management (Djurović-Todorović 
& Djordjević, 2009). As a result of potential inefficiencies and greed in the public 
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services, there are legal and institutional frameworks for public expenditure 
management. The DPME states that: 
Governance and accountability comprise activities linking management structures, 
accountability and ethics to service delivery improvements. Effective governance 
and accountability in the organisation of structures, delegations and resources 
ensure checks and balances to minimise mismanagement and improve 
efficiencies in the delivery of services. Effective governance and accountability 
enable political and administrative leadership in departments to respond 
effectively to the findings and recommendations of oversight committees (DPME, 
2013). 
Corruption in South Africa is rife and as such the country has the characteristics of a 
“Soft State”. Myrdal (1968) defined a “Soft State” as a state that is incapable of 
imposing the right policies and is unwilling to act against corruption at all levels. Other 
characteristics of a Soft State are outlined below:  
 Undesirable social conditions, attitudes, institutions with low discipline, nepotism, 
corruption; and  
 Policies are not enforced, if enacted at all, the level of social discipline is low, 
and there is a high inability to achieve hard targets (Myrdal, 1968).  
The corruption levels contribute massively to South Africa's ranking in the Fragile 
States Index (FSI).  
Figure 5.1: Fragile States Index  
 
 
Source: The Fund for Peace  
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According to the FSI chart above, the upward movements represent worsening trends 
of 2015, a regression of 0.4 percent year on year from the 2014 index. The FSI focuses 
on the indicators of risk across the 178 countries being assessed. All these countries 
are put into four main categories, namely: alert, warning, stable and sustainable 
(Messner, Haken, Taft, Blyth, Lawrence, Pavlou & Umaña, 2015). The countries that 
are in serious trouble, those termed fragile states, are those in the category “Alert”, the 
best category being that of sustainable countries. While South Africa is not at this point 
considered as a fragile state, it is currently classed with a warning that indicates that it 
is a downgrade away from being classified as a fragile state. The lack of improvement 
since 2006 is a cause for concern. In 2006, South Africa was categorised as a stable 
state; however, worsening trends over time mean that it is categorised as with a 
warning. Regarding financial management, the importance of public expenditure 
management is illustrated through the use of information to improve public policy, 
funding choices and to enable accountability. Robinson and Brumby (2005: 12) state 
that: 
The core objectives of performance budgeting is enhanced allocative and 
productive efficiency in public expenditure. In respect to allocative efficiency, 
performance budgeting reformers have been driven by a belief that expenditure 
allocation in the public sector tends to be insufficiently responsive to changing social 
needs and priorities. The perception is that money can keep flowing year after year 
to ineffective programmes because of a lack of accountability for results linked to 
the budget process (Robinson & Brumby, 2005). 
Additionally, plans are not always aligned and synchronised with budget allocations. 
Other challenges include the lack of accountability, particularly for monitoring and 
reporting on performance information, unrealistic target setting and poor quality of 
performance information. To improve this, Chapter 4 discusses allocative efficiency 
principles on how funds can be linked to spending priorities. Moreover, the budget is 
understood to be the mechanism to re-allocate resources. The introduction of 
performance expenditure management reforms in South Africa is linked to broader 
efforts aimed at improving expenditure control and public accountability, as set out in 
the PFMA and MFMA. It can be argued that public expenditure management can be 
used as a tool to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery, as 
well as increasing the flexibility of managers to deliver best services in a cost-effective 
manner and with certainty that outstanding performance will be rewarded.  
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It is worth noting that performance information assists in rationalising budget 
allocations by using performance information as the basis of evidence for making tough 
choices regarding resource allocations. Legitimate implementation of public 
expenditure management systems will ensure that performance information is 
incorporated as part of the budget and resource allocation process, whether at a 
political level or at an administrative level.  
Furthermore, internal accountability is as important as external accountability. The 
former relates to accounting within the institution and includes accounting to set 
principals; while the latter relates to accounting to the external stakeholder, like 
Parliament and the general public.  
Within the South African government context, the annual report (AR) is an ultimate 
accountability document for the government. Legislatures refer to the annual report to 
exercise legitimate oversight and the public also has access to it. Briefly, it is a formal 
requirement for year-end reporting. It is aligned to other planning documents and is the 
first legislative document that highlights how much was spent and what achievements 
were attained. The AR can be used as a yardstick to measure the institution’s 
performance, possible risks and the opinion of the AG. In addition, the AR is a 
published document that allows civil society to meaningfully engage with government 
on all societal issues. The report is made up of four key reports: the accounting officer’s 
report, audit committee report, AG report and the appropriation statement.  
AR records evaluate and report both financial and non-financial information from the 
previous financial year. The AR is regarded as formalised communication and 
accounting to the public. The Office of the AG in the National Treasury publishes 
guideline documents, such as the Guidelines for Annual Reporting for government 
institutions to follow.  
The AR document has the following layout:  
 Part A: Legislative Oversight Role  
 Part B: Performance (Non-financial Data)  
 Part C: Financial Statements – Auditors’ Report  
 Part D: Human Resource Data. 
However, it is acceptable to argue that accountability through the annual report has 
elements of transparency, as it is a document that is made publicly available. While 
the annual report is a reflection of what has happened and how money was spent, 
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there is a missing element. This element is on the planning side of accountability and 
the transparency of government budgets.  
5.3. Transparency 
Public access to fiscal information is strengthened by section 29 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996). The Constitution requires that accurate and 
timely information be made accessible to the general public in order to promote 
transparency in the public service (RSA, 1996). As means of qualifying these 
provisions by the Constitution, the Promotion of Access to Information Act (2000) 
stipulates the procedures for accessing information from government (RSA, 2000). The 
Act seeks to promote transparency and accountability and it can be inferred that 
transparency underpins accountability. Transparency refers to the availability of 
information to the public and also pertains to clarity about government rules and 
regulations. Furthermore, in this regard transparency relates to the provision of access 
to information; active strengthening of the right to information through setting in place 
means to gain access to information; and through the provision of the legal 
enforceability of the provision of information (Athukorala & Reid, 2003). 
Pertaining to the open budget transparency index, South African has been ranked 2nd, 
1st, and 2nd over the last three years respectively. This is an indication that South Africa 
is very transparent with its fiscal affairs.  
Table 5.1: Open Budget Index  
 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, 1998. 
The high level of transparency in South Africa’s budget processes is premised on the 
PFMA and has resulted in the positive outlook and image that South Africa has 
enjoyed. The Minister of Finance tables the Appropriation Bill to Parliament along with 
the Budget Review, and the Estimates of National Expenditure (ENE). While the 
Appropriation Bill has been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the budget review is 
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank Country Score Rank
France 89 1 United Kingdom 88 1 South Africa 92 1 New Zealand 93 1
United Kingdom 88 2 South Africa 87 2 New Zealand 90 2 South Africa 90 2
New Zealand 86 3 France 87 3 United Kingdom 87 3 United Kingdom 88 3
South Africa 86 4 New Zealand 86 4 France 87 4 Sweden 84 4
Slovenia 82 5 United States 82 5 Norway 83 5 Norway 83 5
United States 81 6 Norway 80 6 Sweden 83 6 France 83 6
Peru 77 7 Sweden 78 7 United States 82 7 United States 79 7
Sweden 76 8 Brazil 74 8 Chile 72 8 South Korea 75 8
Brazil 74 9 Slovenia 74 9 Brazil 71 9 Czech Republic 75 9
Poland 74 10 Poland 67 10 South Korea 71 10 Russia 74 10
2006 2008 2010 2012
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identified as a statement of revenue, expenditure and taxation. It looks at various 
elements of the budget, including the composition of expenditure and the fiscal 
framework. The ENE is an account of spending by departments. It is a document with 
a detailed analysis of where the funds were utilised at a departmental level. 
Furthermore, the ENE is an annual government publication describing high-level 
expenditure and performance trends for all national government departments and 
public entities. It is tabled in Parliament along with the Appropriation Bill and other key 
documents, as highlighted in Chapter 3. It has recently been expanded to include a 
write-up on how each department assists the government to realise its policy objectives 
as set out in the NDP, as well as the inclusion of detailed personnel information amidst 
concerns of the increasing wage bill.  
In addition to these documents, the NT also compiles The People’s Budget (a simplified 
version of the strategic documents tabled to Parliament). This is published in various 
languages for ease of understanding. Furthermore, the National Treasury conducts 
cross-country road-shows, particularly at higher education institutions, as a means of 
promoting transparency. There are also other efforts to improve access to public 
budgetary information through the use of simplified budget language. To encourage 
direct public interaction with the Minister of Finance, the National Treasury runs a 
public opinion portal called “tips for the Minister of Finance”. These "tips" are taken into 
consideration and the Minister of Finance includes valuable recommendations in his 
budget speech.  
South Africa's high ranking in the open budget index is a further testament to the 
importance of instilling a culture of transparency in budget documentation. As a result 
of the commitment, South Africa publicly discloses budgetary information, including 
procurement and audit information, through various government websites in a 
simplified and timely manner. In addition to the budget documents that are tabled in 
Parliament, there are also other key source documents that are made available on the 
National Treasury’s website; a key to these is the MTEF. 
The key principles informing inputs into the MTEF database are discussed next. Since 
the 2013 MTEF process, one database has been used throughout the entire budget 
process for the Adjusted Estimates of National Expenditure (AENE), MTEF and the 
ENE processes. Prior to this arrangement, there were three databases that were used, 
namely the ENE, MTEF and the AENE. Below are the budget principles that underlie 
the MTEF process and inform budgeting at both the national and provincial levels. The 
MTEF and its guidelines are set in place to guide against improper budgeting.  
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It is widely reported that public expenditure management is a more scientific approach, 
a paradigm shift from a non-scientific and ill-informed approach which led to various 
departments applying incrementalism in budget allocations. Budget incrementalism 
refers to a process where departments increase their budgets by inflation or some 
other equivalent without taking into account shifts in neither priorities nor the relevance 
of projects in the baselines. The Transportation Research Board (2010: 70) holds a 
similar view and states that:  
The easiest approach is the allocation of resources based on historical levels, with 
the inclusion of an increment or a decrement for inflation and economic growth. 
However, this is generally viewed as the least effective way to allocate resources 
since it can result in years of inertia and resistance to change and can perpetuate 
wrong resource allocations year after year. Many public organisations and 
departments allocate resources this way, in the same breath, private sector 
companies largely switched from this approach to a zero-based budgeting 
approach. The second approach to allocating resources is to base the resource 
allocation on the achievement of set targets. Those that attain or exceed their 
targets get more resources. The logic is that the target is a point on a continuum, 
and the more you exceed the target, the more value you add (Transport Research 
Board, 2010).  
In addition, the most common version of budgetary incrementalism was the proposition 
that budgeting be characterised by:  
Negligence to the budgetary base or allocations in the baselines. In other words, 
budgetary decision-makers take the budgetary base for granted as the starting point 
in budget formulation and tend to focus their attention on the size of the increment 
(or, occasionally, decrement) in agency institutions or programme budgets (Berry, 
1990).  
There is a realisation that the economic recovery from the 2008/09 recession has been 
slow and it is reported that it will probably take another decade or two for South Africa 
to return to its budget surpluses and good credit ratings (National Treasury, 2010). This 
has led to reforms aimed at integrating greater control over the limited programmes 
that can be implemented. These reforms have called for allocative efficiency to be the 
basis for budget allocations as opposed to merely incrementally increasing the 
budgets. Scheps also holds this position and states that:  
Resource allocation decisions are made with constant reference to performance 
data and management's track record of meeting their targets. The key to the 
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success of the system has been to utilise it more than once a year, as means of 
acting as an early warning that management's attention is required. Numerous 
smaller changes in resource allocation can be traced directly to the data 
accumulated in the performance measurement systems (Scheps, 2000: 15).  
However, there is an alternative to budget incrementalism which uses allocative 
efficiency and is known as zero-based budgeting. The concept of zero-based 
budgeting denotes a comprehensive analysis of the budgeting process and implies 
that in each budget process costing and the evaluation of each line item’s relevance is 
necessary. However, this budgeting system is often perceived as cumbersome and 
costly (Burger, 2014: 145). In other departments, the non-use of zero-based budgeting 
has meant that funds are still allocated to items that are irrelevant. In some cases, the 
funds had been allocated to repairs and they continue with repairs to equipment even 
though it would have been cheaper to buy new equipment. This is an indication of 
where budget processes (incrementalism) get in the way of common sense.  
An objective of the zero-based budgeting system is to involve programme managers 
in the budget process (Gildenhuys, 1993: 527). There are a number of criticisms 
against this system of budgeting, the most common being that it is expensive to set 
up, since it implies that in each financial year programme managers need to cost their 
programmes. In addition, Houston finds it problematic that this system implies 
constructing a budget without considering what has gone on in the past (Houston, 
1999: 129). It is noted that these weaknesses are outweighed by the benefits of this 
system. To further strengthen the case for zero-based budgeting, a department does 
not necessarily have to do it every year, but once in three years (linked to the MTEF), 
which would further reduce the costs of service delivery.  
The budget process in the most recent years has used the government’s 14 outcomes 
and their associated output and sub-output targets as the framework underpinning 
public expenditure priorities. These outcomes are the subject of the MTEF discussions 
at all levels, from the functional groups to the minister’s committee on the budget. 
These committees are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. While the 14 outcomes are 
mainly funded from the department’s baselines, additional budgetary resources are 
sometimes required to finance these priorities. This is not always possible, given the 
limited fiscal resources available for distribution. Thus, it is vital that national 
departments reprioritise their baseline allocations and identify savings to fund the 14 
outcomes. The combination of limited fiscal resources and the growing need for 
resources have strengthened the discussions on the efficient and effective use of 
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resources within the already-announced medium-term spending envelope, what is 
referred to as allocative efficiency in Chapter 4.  
As highlighted in the 2016 MTEF guidelines’ principles discussed above; all 
departments are tasked with continually assessing the role, purpose and effectiveness 
of programmes, and whether relevant outputs and outcomes can be attained at a lower 
cost. This principle is referred to as operating efficiency in Chapter 4. While a set 
method for undertaking the continual assessment of budget baselines and new 
expenditure proposals has not been prescribed, the different teams of analysts (within 
the departments, NT, DPME or Parliament) have derived different methods of doing 
this, typically based on the unique circumstances facing the departments they are 
responsible for. However, all the different teams of analysts including the principles 
discussed in the 2016 MTEF guidelines discourage the use of budget incrementalism 
in favour of zero-based budgeting. The latter is seen as a tool to promote accountability 
and transparency. This acts as further evidence that transparency in budget 
information extends to more than making information available to people, but, also 
encompasses the provision of the information in a user-friendly manner.  
Athukorala and Reid (2003) have noted that the budget is the key management 
document in the public sector, and accountability is based on implementing the budget 
as approved by the legislature. If the budget is on a cash basis, then that is going to 
be the dominant basis on which politicians and senior civil servants work. Financial 
reporting on different bases risks becoming a purely technical accounting exercise in 
these cases (Athukorala & Reid, 2003: 51).  
An accrual accounting system is an analytic tool that provides information and insights 
which are not available through the conventional approach of cash budgeting. As 
highlighted in Chapter 4, accrual accounting systems assist in the attainment of VFM. 
From a more conservative approach, it is easy to see and understand why the most 
accurate and viable option would be the accrual system of budgeting. Archibald (1994) 
states that accrual accounting supports improved accountability through improved 
financial management, more openness, better measures of performance and financial 
control, and a business sector compatible approach. He further states that improved 
financial management is possible because resource allocations are clearly related to 
value-for-money decisions. More openness is created by means of the much more 
detailed and comprehensive accounts. This provides for better management decisions 
because financial performance can be measured. In addition, more financial 
information enables the creation of better ways to set targets and measure financial 
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performance. Breakeven analysis, cost recovery and return on assets are three 
applications worth mentioning here. And lastly, the publication of commercial-style 
accounts on an accrual basis allows compatibility and benchmarking with private 
sector organisations. An enterprise does not have to be private to be managed 
entrepreneurially (Archibald, 1994: 4). 
5.4. Summary and conclusion 
In conclusion, financial management relates to budgeting and the successful allocation 
of limited resources. A widely-held view is that the PFMA aims to make it possible for 
managers in the public sector to manage and be held accountable for the use of the 
resources made available to them. Through the PFMA, the law is very clear on what is 
considered appropriate and further stipulates sanctions for inappropriate actions. 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of consequences for transgressions and this is evident 
from the increasing mismanagement of funds as discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, 
it must be noted that there is a level of accountability and transparency in so far as 
budget and spending are concerned. These are enforced by strong institutions like the 
Auditor-General, whose reports are also made public and placed in all departmental 
websites. In addition to this, public debates, the rigorous discussions in Parliament, 
and the strong judicial systems contribute towards an accountable and transparent 
government. Past survey results of the open budget index indicate that South Africa is 
transparent with its budget information. Also commendable, as reflected in Table 3.11, 
is that while South Africa is a developing country, it is constantly in the top four 
alongside developed countries. It is important that transparency is strengthened and 
initiatives like The People’s Budget will give the public a sense of ownership.  
However, the researcher is inclined to note that there are still overlapping questions in 
the information made available. This is specifically the case when considering that 
while the accrual accounting system has proven to be the best holistic system of 
budgeting, South Africa still functions on MCA. Therefore, while the information is 
made available to the public, it is often not a true reflection of the status quo. In addition, 
it is good to note that while the MTEF has proven to be effective in managing future 
expectations and linking budgets to plans, this process still requires that there be 
consistency in which the budget numbers are presented.  
The research also notes that there is still a weakness in how budget numbers are 
presented, specifically the lack of consistency in how they are expressed. This point is 
expressed through the comparison between the accrual accounting and modified cash 
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basis accounting. The latter is used by national and provincial departments while the 
former is used by the municipalities and all government agencies. This inconsistency 
in the accounting systems being used compromises the fiscal consolidated 
expenditure and the credibility of the information made available to external 
stakeholders.  
 In the next chapter, the researcher summarises and discusses salient points, 
interprets results in terms of the literature and theory, and discusses gaps and 
anomalies in the data. Lastly, the thesis concludes by making significant policy 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 6 : SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
6.1. Introduction 
The research systematically examines the credibility of budgets at the national level, 
as well as problems faced by the South African government under the general budget 
related to the public expenditure management systems. It focuses on a four-year 
period, from 2011/12 to 2014/15. The last part of this chapter makes recommendations 
on reforms needed to ensure that the budget is credible.  
The budget is a key statement of policy of the government. It indicates how public 
resources plan to be used to meet policy goals (OECD, 2007). The World Bank, 
through the PEM Handbook, states that governments’ budgets should be spent in 
accordance with fiscal discipline, allocative priorities and operational productivity. 
However, accountability and transparency have become the additional budget 
outcomes towards which countries should strive.  
In the context of national government, the PFMA is a regulatory framework that is 
aimed at improving public finance management and strengthening allocative, 
operational efficiency, transparency and accountability. To this end, the PFMA places 
the responsibility of managing South Africa’s National Government finances on the 
National Treasury. In response to this regulatory framework, the National Treasury’s 
mandate as stated in their Strategic Planning document is to support efficient and 
sustainable public financial management and promote economic development, good 
governance, social progress and a rising standard of living for all South Africans 
(National Treasury, 2014). In addition to this, the South African Constitution mandates 
the National Treasury to ensure accountability, transparency and rigorous financial 
controls in the management of public finances (RSA, 1996). Given the difficult fiscal 
context facing the South African government, it is important that sound financial control 
principles become a perpetual feature of the budget preparation process. So in this 
chapter, the researcher discusses the key findings on expenditure management 
objectives and what these mean for South African budgetary reforms for National 
Departments.  
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6.2. Aggregate fiscal discipline 
The aggregate expenditure outcome compared to approved budgets, the composition 
of expenditure outcome compared to approved budgets, and aggregate revenue 
outcome compared to original approved budgets show that the South African 
government does not raise the revenue it sets itself to raise; and neither does it spend 
the expenditure it aims to spend. A rising concern is that the expenditure has 
outperformed revenue in both estimates and actuals. This is likely to drive South Africa 
into an unsustainable trajectory. In addition to this, revenue estimates have been below 
the actual revenue collected for most of the recent financial years, an indication of a 
tendency to consciously target for what is easily achievable. These facts, coupled with 
the ever-increasing debt service costs, March spike and virements compromise the 
credibility of aggregate fiscal discipline and are leading South Africa to unsustainable 
debt levels. The worst-case scenario is a debt trap. This is likely to be the outcome if 
the South African government implements any programmes as costly as the NHI, 
nuclear power and post education without cutting down on programmes of similar 
value.  
The analysis of aggregate fiscal discipline shows that the major challenge of the fiscal 
pressures in South Africa has been caused by increasing government debts, which 
were strongly influenced by the global economic recession. Massive investment in 
social services, high unemployment rate, limited private sector contribution to the 
economy, and poor performance by the primary sector have posed many challenges 
for the state. Consequently, the revenue generated is not sufficient to finance the 
government expenditure. There is mounting pressure on the government to continue 
increasing social services, whilst the financial markets are unstable and the value of 
the South African rand is weak. This negative impact of public debt on economic 
growth, as far as the policy perspective is concerned, strengthens the arguments for 
ambitious debt reduction through fiscal consolidation.  
6.3. Value for money 
Value for money begins with the questioning of the assumption that citizens 
understand what funding refers to on budget and what service delivery plans are to 
take place against this funding. There are various ways in which value for money and 
PV are being promoted in South African financial management systems. While the 
National Treasury is required by the PFMA to ensure value for money, the budgeting 
process seeks to create PV. While great efforts have been employed to achieve both 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
VFM and PV, there are obvious gaps that need to be addressed. Furthermore, to drive 
VFM, a budgeting discipline for a comprehensive accounting standard must be set.  
In addition, efforts to improve the credibility of budgets and their management must be 
based on how responsive they are to community needs. This can be achieved through 
improved dialogue and public participation on budget-related matters. Furthermore, 
communities must see the value of programmes. In African communities, culture is not 
written down; therefore, the PV needs to be embedded on that basis.  
6.4. Allocative efficiency 
Through allocative efficiency, government needs to ensure that budget as policy intent 
achieves intended outcomes. Here, the question is whether the social benefits of these 
policies (budgets) outweigh social costs. The high levels of debt and debt service costs 
indicate that there are issues regarding allocative efficiency. As a measure of whether 
government has achieved its intended outcomes, lack of progress in income inequality 
as measured by the Gini coefficient and the combination of the life expectancy at birth 
(longevity), knowledge and GDP per capita as measured by the HDI indicate that 
government has been unable to utilise its resources to better the socio-economic 
conditions and address the imbalances of the past.  
This thesis highlights that a large part of the debt increases of the past decades are 
related to higher public consumption, specifically on compensation of employees. 
Taking this into account, the current trajectory is not sustainable, as this consumption 
expenditure has no positive spinoff on future economic outlook prospects. Thus, these 
challenges and concerns need to be dealt with in order to ensure successful outcomes 
of the intent of the fiscal policy. Therefore, allocative efficiency is compromised as large 
sums of money are spent servicing the debt rather than on government priorities, 
paying for compensation of employees rather than on sustained spending on capital 
investment.  
Lastly, budget incrementalism practices undermine the efforts to allocate resources 
efficiently. While there are growing efforts to improve performance information and 
strengthen controls in this regard, there is a need for this information to inform the 
actual budget baselines. The current trajectory of paying attention to prospects of 
additional funds limits the interrogation of current baselines and their items which could 
yield efficiencies in the budgeting system.  
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6.5. Operational efficiency 
There are a lot of operational inefficiencies in how government finances are handled. 
This is denoted by the expenditure that is unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and 
wasteful. This an indication that there is a need to strengthen financial management 
systems and accounting standards in order to strengthen government’s ability to spend 
voted funds efficiently, thereby ensuring VFM on government spending.  
Government services are to be delivered at the lowest possible costs (“efficiency”), 
given an acceptable level of quality with minimal waste. Apropos of this objective, the 
high levels of unauthorised, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure show high 
levels of operational inefficiency, which are perpetuated by growing trends over time, 
especially regarding the irregular expenditure. The absence of consequences for 
financial transgressions perpetuates these transgressions. Consistent with this, 
corruption in South Africa is rife; consequently, the country has the characteristics of a 
Soft State. This position is echoed by Peter Allwright (2013), who conducted research 
on financial misconduct in the public service and found that financial misconduct was 
rampant in government and the situation was worsened by the absence of consistent 
and appropriate sanctioning of officials.  
6.6. Accountability 
Accountability refers to instilling an irreproachable ethical conduct amongst politicians 
and the administration. There needs to be a desire and ability to act with integrity in 
compliance with the requirements of public accountability. Such values are embedded 
in the Constitution, the PFMA and the White Paper on Public Administration on Batho 
Pele Principles.  
Line departments have a habit of viewing financial resources as a means to an end; 
an enabler to deliver more and higher-quality services, but are not often willing to put 
controls in place to ensure accountability for the spend. As a result, even though 
explicit sanctions on politicians and public servants for violating budgetary rules are 
stated in government’s policy documents and law, they are seldom held responsible 
for the exercise of the authority provided to them. Internal accountability is accounting 
within the institution and includes accounting to the principals. The values of 
unauthorised, irregular and fruitless and wasteful expenditure indicate lack of internal 
controls. Lack of internal accountability is when the principals cannot hold their 
subordinates to account. On the other hand, the external accountability relates to 
accounting to the external stakeholder, like Parliament and the general public.  




Fiscal policy based on fiscal guidelines for South Africa: counter-cyclicality, long-term 
debt sustainability, and inter-generational equity principles support the New Growth 
Path by encouraging investment, lowering long-term interest rates and contributing to 
a competitive exchange rate National Treasury, 2013). It is also hoped that clear 
principles for fiscal policy will strengthen parliamentary oversight of the budget 
process, encourage greater transparency and enhance public accountability.  
Furthermore, budget transparency refers to the extent to which the public is informed 
of the spending priorities, expenditures and underlying reforms in order for all 
interested stakeholders to monitor, evaluate, and hold government accountable. Apart 
from the Open Budget Transparency Index, other measures that affirm that the public 
is properly informed include the following:  
 The budget documents are presented to the legislature for approval;  
 There is frequency in the in-year reporting;  
 The audit reports are made available to the public.  
The use of MCA implies that the South African accounting system does not take into 
account the full value of costs and transactions. In addition to this, the MCA is not an 
international best-practice accounting system; therefore, it is not compatible with 
systems used in other countries and the private sector. This makes benchmarking with 
other countries and the private sector organisations impossible.  
6.8. Credibility of the budget 
Given the scope and significance of government budgets, small errors in forecasts can 
result in significant variations in the budget out-turns. To this end, basing spending and 
revenue projections on faulty economic assumptions is harmful. South Africa finds 
itself with increasing debt costs and widening debt-to-GDP ratio. The latter is due to 
incorrect assumptions about the economic growth, while the former is always as 
projected but is undesirable. To elucidate on the last point, as seen in Chapter 3, 
revenue projections are always lower than the expenditure projections, which leads to 
the accumulation of debt. Debt accumulation contradicts two of the three main 
economic principles of the South African fiscal policy, which are long-term debt 
sustainability and inter-generational equity. The former refers to spending levels which 
must ensure that debt and interest costs do not rise indefinitely, while the latter is 
concerned with the long-term costs of spending programmes.  
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Key to these discussions are the virements and the March spike. The former refers to 
a legislated process of shifting funds from one priority to the next, while the latter refers 
to the enormous expenditure at the end of the financial year. On the one hand, funds 
are shifted from transfers and subsidies and payment for capital assets towards 
compensation of employees. On the other hand, much of the expenditure on core 
budget is done in March. Lastly, regarding the payment of invoices within 30 days of 
receipt, the number and rand value of unpaid invoices is unacceptably high, and this 
speaks to inadequate internal controls and systems to track invoices and is 
exacerbated by inadequate consequence management. The analysis further shows 
that the credibility of government budgets is compromised by the phenomenon and 
unless they are addressed, the allocative and operational efficiencies of the budgets 
will always be compromised.  
6.9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the pre-conditions for successful implementation of the public 
expenditure management systems include: proper governance; a culture of financial 
acumen; control systems; capable personnel with the required technical skills; and 
officials held accountable for their financial transgressions. To achieve this, South 
Africa has legislated the financial management of government finances through an Act 
of Parliament, the PFMA. The PFMA was first adopted in 1999 and governs financial 
transactions for both the national and provincial governments. At the local government 
level, the MFMA governs municipal financial transactions. In addition to these laws, 
there is a subordinate law, the Treasury Regulations, which compliments both the 
PFMA and the MFMA and gives substance to these laws. The Treasury 
Regulations are responsible for enforcing the 30-day rule for the payment of invoices 
by various government institutions.  
The extensive fiscal pressures in South Africa have been caused by widening 
government debts that have been strongly influenced by the global economic 
recession; massive investment in social services; high unemployment rate; limited 
private-sector contribution to the economy; and poor performance by the primary 
sector, thus posing many challenges for the state. Consequently, the revenue 
generated is not sufficient to finance government expenditure. There is pressure on 
the government to continue increasing social services, financial markets are unstable 
and the value of the South African rand is weak. This negative impact of public debt 
on economic growth, as far as the policy perspective is concerned, strengthens the 
arguments for ambitious debt reduction through fiscal consolidation.   
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The findings of this research study have revealed that there is a need to balance 
revenue and spending, and address the composition of expenditure so that productive 
expenditure outweighs current expenditure by the government. Failure to address the 
current trajectory might result in South Africa reaching the sixty-percent (60%) ratio of 
debt to GDP, which is considered to be very high and unhealthy by rating agencies 
and the World Bank. The notion that change in the debt ratio and the budget deficits 
are linearly and negatively associated with growth (and with the long-term interest 
rates) may point to a more detrimental impact on the public debt stock even below the 
sixty-percent (60%) threshold. Therefore, targeting a higher debt level to support 
growth is not a policy option.  
The rand exchange rate remains too high and the central bank is concerned that the 
long-term inflation trajectory remains uncomfortably fragile, with the risk of inflation 
compromising the value of the South African rand, thereby negatively impacting on 
South African consumers (National Treasury, 2015b). There is a need to ensure that 
the impact of inflation on spending and decisions to invest are minimised in order to 
maintain the purchasing power of expenditure.  
6.10. Recommendations 
The recommendations emanating from the study are the following:  
1. The National Government budget should aim to maintain support for the 
economy and service delivery through stabilising public debt as a share of GDP 
by achieving a balance between revenue growth, borrowing and growth in 
spending. This can be achieved by aligning the budget to the priorities of 
government (NDP and MTSF), and on the basis of evidence of programme 
effectiveness and an appropriate balance between capital and current spending. 
With the government facing a spending ceiling, opportunities for expanding and 
improving service delivery will need to be financed within existing allocations. A 
combination of placing a continued emphasis on spending efficiency and 
effectiveness is referred to as value for money. Those programmes that are not 
performing, and are no longer significant or are not a priority, must have their 
allocations reduced. This will ensure aggregate fiscal discipline.  
2. There is a need for legislation that would prohibit the March spike and enforce 
tighter controls that will limit the use of virements. These practices overstate 
expenditure by the end of each financial year.  
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3. The composition of expenditure as discussed in Chapter 4 shows that 
government expenditure is skewed towards compensation of employees. In 
addition, the analysis of virements in Chapter 3 shows that, even in-year, funds 
are shifted towards compensation of employees from transfers and subsidies. 
The National Government should maintain an aggregate spending ceiling in 
compensation of employees, i.e. no additional funds over and above the 2016 
MTEF baselines of departments and public entities. To do this, a detailed 
analysis of CoE will be critical to determine pressure points and surpluses. 
Departments must undertake a detailed review of the performance of all their 
programmes, including that of Corporate Services, from a performance and cost 
effectiveness perspective. This will ensure allocative efficiency.  
4. There is a need to minimise negative internal threats such as corruption. This will 
require that the government deals decisively with corruption and 
mismanagement of funds. To do this, control must be strengthened and a clear 
procedure for dealing with the consequences of financial transgressions set. This 
will ensure operational efficiency.  
5. National departments must migrate to accrual accounting for the national 
government to attain value for money. Accrual accounting promotes 
transparency, a culture driven by performance and accountability, and a respect 
for costs.  
6. The National Treasury must design the budget preparation process in a way that 
allows information from evaluations to be available at the right time and in the 
right format to assess new proposals and ongoing programmes. Without the 
information and a well-designed expenditure prioritisation process, ineffective, 
inefficient or low-priority programmes will continue to drain resources for years. 
The ongoing quest for the Department of Planning and Monitoring and 
Evaluations is to establish a good evaluation system, a system that will not only 
provide information to departments on how to improve their performance 
policies, but is also tailored to meet the needs of the political and budget decision 
makers at several key moments.  
7. Expenditure reviews must be integrated into the mainstream budget process and 
must inform policy and decision makers about programme effectiveness and 
efficiency under current funding levels. In addition, expenditure reviews must be 
able to examine the consequences for outputs and outcomes of alternative 
funding levels.  
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